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Abstract
Using econometric, theoretical and modeling approaches, this dissertation studies how the processes of gen-
trification and interregional migration affect the location decisions of individuals. The first paper analyzes
the effect of gentrification on the housing price premium distribution using data from Chicago. Assuming
a monotonic relationship between housing prices and income, the results suggest that gentrification causes
displacement of the low-income population because the appreciation of houses in the lower tail of the distri-
bution is greater in properties located in gentrified neighborhoods. The estimations correct for endogeneity
of the gentrification definition, and for the spatial correlation of housing prices.
The second paper develops a general equilibrium model of workers’ interregional allocation. The model
considers an economy with two sectors called manufacturing and violence, and mobile labor and capital.
Workers choose their location by observing the wage differentials and two distortions in the economy: the
existence of unemployment in the cities and a distortion in the violence sector related to the “guilt and fear”
faced by individuals working there. An increase in the manufacturing wage increases the unemployed labor
in the cities, but the effect is lower when the initial unemployment is high. On the other hand, an increase
in the manufacturing wage could either increase or decrease the violence labor, and these changes are less
positive (or more negative) with high initial levels of violence.
Finally, the third paper uses a CGE-microsimulation model to analyze the effects of an ex ante legal-
ization of drugs on the Colombian economy. Changes in wages and migration are estimated using a labor
participation model, and households demand and welfare measures are calculated using the Almost Ideal
Demand System. The impacts of legalizing drugs are analyzed under different scenarios with different as-
sumptions regarding the changes in drug price, government investment and the termination of the armed
conflict. If the legalization of drugs ends the armed conflict, economic welfare is only improved if the gov-
ernment reinvests the military expenditures into other productive sectors. If the armed conflict does not
end with legalization, the legalization of drugs could improve economic welfare in rural and urban areas.
These welfare effects are not monotonic with income; the lowest income deciles benefit more than the highest
deciles, with rural areas benefiting more than urban areas.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Most of the early migration studies have focused on migration between different countries, but studies about
households’ allocation within cities, or interregional migration between rural and urban areas have been
studied as an important issue of development and urbanization only since the 1950s. Households’ allocation
within cities affect the dynamics of the urban center, influencing issues such as racial and income segregation,
segmented housing markets, and neighborhoods effects. On the other hand, rural-urban migration is a
phenomenon that affects not only economic growth, but also the social well-being of individuals and the
evolution of cities as urban centers of development. Using econometric, theoretical and modeling approaches,
this dissertation studies how the processes of gentrification and interregional migration affect the location
decisions of individuals.
Since the 1970s, the literature began analyzing the concept of “urban poverty” as a consequence of
the rural-urban migration and within-city segregation (Berner, 2001). Migration is not only associated
with modernization and economic growth, but also with urban disamenities generated by rapid population
growth and the inability of the modern sector to absorb the new labor supply. Heterogeneity within the city
produces segregation among communities, and neighborhood sorting exacerbates the urban conditions for
new immigrants and minorities. Ethnic enclaves have been often created in U.S. cities as a consequence of
the urbanization processes, and most of the urban poverty observed in the country occurs in neighborhoods
where the majority of the population belongs to a minority or to an immigrant group (Jargowsky, 1997).
In contrast, in developing countries, new immigrants are employed mainly in the informal sector and are
segregated to areas in the cities where the land market is not regulated and where there is limited access to
public services (Berner, 2001). The gap between the income distribution of existing residents and that of
new immigrants or minorities has increased, and welfare differentials in the urban areas have been affected
by the increasing urbanization of cities.
Although the theoretical models of Tiebout (1956) and Schelling (1969) explain how the complete sorting
of households is achieved through household allocation choices, recent urbanization processes such as the
process of gentrification in different U.S. cities have shown that perfect segregation is broken when low-income
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city neighborhoods face housing renovations followed by an influx of mid- and high-income populations. The
Tiebout model explains how the level of expenditures for local public goods reflects the preferences of a
population. For example, an individual’s decision to move from one community to another depends on his
preferences for the public goods that are locally provided. On the other hand, Schelling studies segregation
from the perspective of the discriminatory choices of individuals. Making a two-fold distinction, he finds
that ethnically mixed areas do not constitute a stable equilibrium because people often tend to create
clusters with other people who are similar, often producing a complete segregation between two groups.
The decision of high-income households to migrate to city neighborhoods due to amenities attractiveness,
housing renovation, or lower transportation costs, affects the demographic dynamics in the city. While
some studies suggest that segregation increases because of the displacement of low-income population from
gentrified neighborhoods, some others claim that gentrification is an effective policy to reduce segregation
and create mixed-communities.
In chapter 2, the effect of gentrification in the lower tail of the housing price premium distribution using
individual housing transactions in the city of Chicago is estimated to make inferences about population
displacement from gentrified neighborhoods. The housing premium is defined as the appreciation of housing
prices from 2000-2005, and the gentrification variable is defined as a combination of two phenomena: housing
renovation and influx of mid- and upper-income households to low-income neighborhoods. Using quantile
regressions with three different specifications, the results correct for endogeneity of the gentrification def-
inition and for the spatial correlation of housing prices. The results are robust in different specifications:
housing prices in gentrified neighborhoods appreciate more than in non-gentrified neighborhoods in every
percentile of the distribution, including prices located in the lower tail. Assuming a monotonic relation-
ship between housing prices and income, these results suggest that gentrification appreciates the prices of
low-value dwellings generating displacement of the low-income population. However, the appreciation is
lower in the lower tail than in the upper tail of the price premium distribution, suggesting that the influx
of high-income populations to gentrified neighborhoods is stronger than the displacement of low-income
households.
Using a theoretical model, chapter 3 analyzes workers’ allocation between rural and urban areas when
the migration decision depends also on noneconomic factors. Since the decade of the 1950s, noneconomic
factors have played an important role on understanding migration. Wolpert (1965) develops the idea of
place utility to understand migration. Different locations offer different amenities and households observe
this “bundle” of characteristics in each location and choose the one that maximize their utility. Migration
occurs when the expected utility in a different place is greater than the utility received in the current place
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(Brown and Moore, 1970). Some of the migration studies that consider noneconomic factors are Cole and
Sanders (1985), Yap (1997), Gelan (2002), Gonzalez-Rodriguez (2005), Stark and Taylor (1991), and Stiglitz
(1974), among others.
Following Harris and Todaro (1970), chapter 3 uses a general equilibrium model to explore the impact
of changes in the manufacturing wage on employment and prices. The model considers an economy with
mobile labor and capital and two sectors called manufacturing and violence (including for example, illegal
drug business). The labor migration between manufacturing and violence activities depends not only on the
wage differentials, but also on non-economic factors such as the unemployment rate in cities and a distortion
in the violence sector related to the “guilt and fear” faced by individuals working there. The effect a policy
to increase the minimum manufacturing wage depends on the initial conditions of the economy. An increase
in the manufacturing wage increases the amount of unemployed labor in the cities, but the effect is lower
when the initial unemployment is high. On the other hand, the disutility faced by violence workers is
greater with high levels of initial violence. An increase in the manufacturing wage could either increase or
decrease the violence sector labor, and these changes are less positive (or more negative) with high initial
levels of violence. The paper concludes with a policy implication analysis of the tradeoff between decreasing
violence and decreasing unemployment, and compares the results of the model with the illegal drug market
in Colombia.
Chapter 4 analyzes households’ location choices between rural and urban areas using data from Colombia.
Colombia is an interesting case study for analyzing migration, because the rural areas have an armed conflict
that is linked with the production and trafficking of illegal drugs. Then, migration to the cities is triggered
not only by wage differentials, but also by socio-political factors related to the insecurity that households
face in the rural areas. Studies that analyze the migration decision of the displaced population include
Lozano-Gracia et al. (2010), Schaeffer (2010), Ibanez and Velez (2008) and Villa and Rodriguez (2010).
The last report of the Global Commission on Drug Policy of June 2011 concludes that the war on drugs
imposed 50 years ago by President Nixon and by the U.N., has failed. The problems associated with the drug
trafficking include violence, intimidation, drug dependency, and domestic and international displacement.
In this chapter, I analyze the effects on the Colombian economy of legalizing drugs.
Using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) microsimulation model, the effects of an ex ante legal-
ization of drugs on the Colombian economy are analyzed. The model consists of eleven productive sectors
(including illegal activities), three different labor force categories with unemployment, and twenty households
divided by income and location (rural and urban). Changes in wages and migration are estimated using a
labor participation model. An Almost Ideal Demand System estimates the households’ demand of the CGE
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model, and it is also used to estimate the impacts on economic welfare, once the shock of legalization is sim-
ulated. The impacts of legalizing drugs are analyzed under six different scenarios with different assumptions
regarding the changes in drug price, government investment and the termination of the armed conflict. The
results suggest that household economic welfare is very sensitive to reinvestments the government makes in
the economy. If the legalization of drugs ends the armed conflict, economic welfare is only improved if the
government reinvests the military expenditures into other productive sectors such as health, education and
transportation. If the armed conflict does not end with legalization and the “economy of war” continues,
the legalization of drugs could improve economic welfare in rural and urban areas. These welfare effects are
not monotonic with income; the lowest income deciles benefit more than the highest income deciles, with
rural areas benefiting more than urban areas.
The appendix provides additional explanation for the methodology used in chapter 4 to link the CGE
models with microsimulation models. Because all the agents in the economy are affected, the shock is
analyzed using a CGE model. However, when the interest centers on poverty or welfare impacts at the
household level, microeconometric models are needed in order to account for microeconomic behavior of
households. The CGE model interacts with two microeconomic models: a labor participation model to
measures migration decisions of households, and an Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) to estimate
household demand and calculate welfare measures of different household groups. The interaction between the
CGE model and the labor participation model considers feedback loops from top to bottom and behavioral
responses from households at the microeconomic level. On the other hand, the interaction between the CGE
and the AIDS could be described in two steps: I first use the AIDS model to estimate the budget shares, to
use in the CGE model, and then I use the changes in income and prices from the CGE model in the AIDS
framework to calculate the welfare measures of different household deciles.
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Chapter 2
The effects of gentrification on the
housing price premium distribution:
Evidence from Chicago
2.1 Introduction
Many large American cities have recently undergone urban renewal processes better known as gentrification,
urban revitalization or neighborhood renewal processes. Urban renewal refers to housing renovation followed
by the process of resettlement of the upper middle class into low-income city neighborhoods (Clay, 1979).
Although some authors suggest that low-income populations are not displaced from these neighborhoods (see
Freeman, 2009; and McKinnish et al., 2010), others suggest that urban renewal increases income disparities
and racial segregation in the inner cities as a result of the influx of middle- and high-income populations
into gentrified neighborhoods (Walks and Maaranen, 2008; Lees, 2008). A better way to understand the
effects of urban renewal processes is to analyze their effect on the housing price premium distribution, and
then, make inferences about the income composition of gentrified neighborhoods, and compare it to the one
of non-gentrified neighborhoods.
The socioeconomic effects of urban renewal processes have been analyzed both qualitatively and quanti-
tatively. Joseph and Chaskin (2010) conduct surveys in gentrifying neighborhoods in Chicago to analyze the
perception of the gentrified and the gentrifying population in terms of displacement, quality of life and social
relations. DeVerteuil (2010) perform a similar exercise in some gentrified neighborhoods of London and Los
Angeles by analyzing the displacement of social services facilities as a proxy of displacement of the popula-
tion. Recent quantitative analyses that focus on the causes of gentrification, its consequences, and the study
of mixed-income communities include studies by Freeman (2005), Freeman (2009), McKinnish et al. (2010),
Brueckner and Rosenthal (2009), Bostic and Martin (2003), and Atkinson (2003) among others . Epple and
Sieg (1999), Galster (2007), and Galster and Booza (2007) have investigated the existence and stability of
mixed-income neighborhoods in central locations using theoretical models of population sorting, finding an
optimal combination of economic efficiency and distributive equity, and calculating entropy indexes to define
bipolar neighborhoods.
Using individual housing prices from Chicago, this paper aims to explain the effect of gentrification on
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the housing price premium distribution, specifically in the lower tail of the distribution, in order to make
conclusions about the displacement of the low-income population from gentrified neighborhoods. I use two
different specifications of quantile regressions to control for endogeneity of the gentrification definition, and
for the spatial correlation of housing prices: in the first case, I implement the quantile treatment effect (QTE)
estimator developed by Abadie et al. (2002) using the proximity of the neighborhoods to an Alderman’s ward
office as an instrument. In the second case, I consider the spatial dependence of housing prices and correct
for spatial autocorrelation using kernel weighted quantile regressions.
This work contributes to the growing body of literature related to gentrification in urban areas by explain-
ing the effect of urban renewal in the housing price distribution and inferring for displacement of population
using a quantitative approach. Although quantile regressions have been used before to calculate housing
price indexes and to estimate the specific marginal effects of housing characteristics in different percentiles
of the housing price distribution (McMillen, 2008; Mak et al., 2010; Zietz et al., 2008, among others), to
the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first to use quantile regressions, both parametrically and non-
parametrically, to estimate the effects of gentrification on the appreciation of housing prices. Additionally, I
test my results by controlling for the endogeneity of the gentrification definition and the spatial correlation
of housing prices.
Chicago has been an interesting case study in the gentrification literature because of the frequent and
widespread relocations that have occurred in past decades, and the attempts made by the city to imple-
ment several programs to avoid segregation in neighborhoods (Lin, 2002; Nyden et al., 2006; Helms, 2003;
and Betancur, 2002). The Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) and the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (DHUD) have attempted to reduce the level of housing segregation in the city by creating
mixed-income housing development programs such as the Gatreaux program, the HOPE VI housing rede-
velopment program, the Lake Park Place program, and the Plan for Transformation (for details, see Joseph
and Chaskin, 2010; Wylyl and Hammel, 2000; and vonHoffman, 1996). If the effect of urban renewal pro-
cesses is different on different percentiles of the housing price distribution, the gentrification phenomenon
could be seen as a successful market-driven alternative to create income mixing and reduce segregation in
central city neighborhoods. On the contrary, if results suggest displacement of the low-income population,
housing policy analysts should potentially control housing renovation and influx of high-income migrants
into low-income neighborhoods in order to reduce income and social segregation.
According to the results of this paper, gentrification appreciates the housing prices in every percentile
of the distribution, but this appreciation is lower in the lower tail than in the upper tail. Assuming a
monotonic relationship between income and housing prices, the results suggest that gentrification does
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displace the low-income population, but the influx effect of mid- and high-income households is greater than
the displacement effect. These results support findings obtained by qualitative analyses, but they differ from
the conclusions of most econometric studies where no evidence of displacement is found. Nevertheless, mixed-
income communities can be created if the influx of high-income households is stronger than the displacement
of low-income groups.
The section below defines gentrification and explains the identification strategy and the econometric
models. Section 2.3 describes the data used for testing the model and section 2.4 presents an analysis of the
results. Section 2.5 concludes and provides some policy implications of the analysis.
2.2 Gentrification definition and identification strategy
2.2.1 Gentrification definition
One of the problems associated with empirical models of urban renewal is constructing an appropriate
measure by which to define gentrified neighborhoods. There are different definitions of urban renewal based
on housing price changes or changes in household status (household size, structure, income or education).
Since the process of urban renewal is complex, it is not possible to include all of the potential neighborhood
changes in a single definition. Freeman (2005) defines gentrification using five dimensions: location, median
household income, housing construction, education attainment and housing prices. Hammel and Wyly (1996)
emphasize new upscale housing construction, but also consider the replacement of low-income populations
by the middle or upper classes. Similarly Clay (1979) and Helms (2003) emphasize that the gentrification
and urban renewal phenomenon is a mixture of two forces: an increase in housing renovation, and the influx
of mid- and high-income households to low-income neighborhoods.1
Gentrification in this paper is understood as a “neighborhood change” phenomenon with the presence of
the two forces described by Clay (1979) and Helms (2003). The increase in housing renovation is measured by
1The definition of gentrification varies in the literature. While some authors include demographic trends in the definition,
some others decide to link it only to changes in family income. Lees and Ley (2008) define gentrification as the “third model”
of urban regeneration in which the main driver is a specific public policy, a phenomenon that has been observed in London
with the government improvement grants, and in New York with the Urban Homesteading Program. McKinnish et al. (2010)
define gentrified neighborhoods as those neighborhoods that had an increase in the median family income from 1990 to 2000 of
more than US$10,000 dollars. They believe that by including demographic trends on the gentrification definition, the definition
will determine the results of the gentrification studies. Brueckner and Rosenthal (2009) include the age of the housing stock in
gentrified neighborhoods as the main determinant of gentrification because neighborhoods with older housing stock are more
prompted to be gentrified. The existence of high-income households in central and low-income neighborhoods is also explained
by the existence of natural and historic amenities (Brueckner et al., 1999), the choice of the transportation model (LeRoy
and Sonstelie, 1983) or fiscal explanations such as the redistributive central city taxation for the improvement of public goods
(Nechyba and Walsh, 2004). The College of Urban Planning and Public Affairs of the University of Illinois at Chicago develops
a gentrification index where the communitiy areas of the city are classified between 13 and -13, scoring 13 the community
areas with the most factors associated with gentrification. The variables considered are median family income, % families
below poverty, median house value, % owner-occupied housing, race/ethnicity, % children age 5-19, % elderly, % managers and
professionals, % adults with college education, % children enrolled in private schools and % of female-headed households with
dependent children under age 18.
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the amount of building permits approved in the neighborhood. The influx of mid and high-income households
is measured by income change from 1990 to 2000, weighted by the proportion of migrants in both years.
Gentrified neighborhoods are then defined as those neighborhoods that satisfy the three following conditions:
1. They belonged to the three lowest income quintiles in 1990.
2. They had a number of building permits for residential alterations from 1993 to 2000 greater than the
median number of building permits approved in the city.2
3. Their income growth from 1990 to 2000, weighted by the proportion if immigrants, was greater than
the median for the city.3
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show the low-income neighborhoods (condition 1) that fulfill conditions 2 and 3,
respectively. The combination of these two conditions defines gentrified neighborhoods. Figure 2.3 shows
the areas of the city experiencing gentrification. The first cluster is observed in neighborhoods that are
located at the West of the Loop including West Town, Logan Square, Near West Side and Near North Side.
The second cluster in the far north side is formed by the neighborhoods of Uptown, Lakeview, Albany Park
and Rogers Park. Finally, the third cluster is observed in the south with neighborhoods such as Grand
Boulevard, Woodlawn, Kenwood, Oakland, Englewood, Armour Square, Douglas, Hyde Park, Washington
Park, Fuller Park and Chatham.
Some of the neighborhoods located in the west were industrial neighborhoods that had their warehouses
transformed into residential flats during the 1990s (Henderson, 2007). In the north, Uptown is considered one
of the most diverse neighborhoods in Chicago and has been a focus of urban revitalization since 1968 when
Truman College was constucted. In the 1990s, the percentage of lots converted into condos increased by
102%, although it is still considered a diversified neighborhood with 42% white, 21% black, and 20% Hispanic
(Henderson, 2007). On the south side, the increase in immigrant income is stronger than housing renovation.
Most of the housing renovation was caused by redevelopment of public housing, with programs such as
HOPE VI in the Oakland and North Kenwood neighborhoods. Although this renovation was considered in
the gentrification definition, most of these public housing projects were demolished at the beginning of the
2000s by the “Plan for Transformation” developed by the Chicago Housing Authority. In the 1990s, the
city of Chicago designated the south lakefront as a “conservation area” facilitating new investments in city
neighborhoods closer to downtown (Pattillo, 2007).4
2Building permit information is provided by the Chicago Housing Authority. Permits are classified into eight different types:
additions, alteration existing usage, alteration using usage, demolition, miscellaneous or revisions, new construction, repairs
general and repairs by order of the building. Only alterations to residential dwellings are considered.
3The proportion of immigrants in 1990 and 2000 is measured by the proportion of households in the neighborhood that were
not living in the same house five years before. This proportion is multiplied by the median family income of the neighborhood
and the income changes from 1990 to 2000 are calculated.
4The “conservation area” status allows the residents of the area to work with the local public authorities in the development
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2.2.2 Identification strategy: specification of the empirical models
The effect of gentrification on the price premium distribution can be compared to the effect of a treatment
on an outcome, where the treated group is the gentrified neighborhoods and the control group is the non-
gentrified neighborhoods. However, in this case the treatment is not completely exogenous because of the
existence of simultaneity between the level of income of a neighborhood and its housing prices. Although
the distribution of housing prices used in the dependent variable is drawn using housing prices from 2005
(post-gentrification), high income neighborhoods are more likely to have higher housing prices and lower
probability of being gentrified. Moreover, neighborhoods with higher housing prices were likely to have high
income in the previous period. This simultaneity between the outcome (housing prices) and the definition
of the treated variable (gentrification) causes endogeneity problems that bias results.
In order to address this endogeneity, we need a valid instrumental variable (IV) that not only explains
the gentrification process but also is unrelated to the appreciation of housing prices in 2005. This valid
IV should be uncorrelated to housing prices, although it could be correlated to housing characteristics and
other covariates used to explain the appreciation of prices. Chicago is divided in 50 ward offices, each of
them represented by an Alderman. The Aldermen are members of the city council and take decisions about
the use of city funds and the city ordinances. Usually, for the approval of building permits, citizens apply
to their corresponding ward, and the Alderman processes the information and passes it to the Department
of Buildings for the final approval. Depending on which ward the neighborhood is located, the building
permit approval could be faster or slower. The instrument for gentrification on this paper is the proximity
of a neighborhood to a ward office. Not only the approval of building permits depends on the ward the
neighborhood belongs, but also the ward office is more influenced by neighborhoods that are closer by than
neighborhoods that are farther away.
Figure 2.4 shows the location of the 50 ward offices in Chicago and the neighborhoods that were gentrified
in 1990s. The correlation between gentrified neighborhoods and the location of ward offices is stronger in
the north and west, than in the south. Some of the ward offices are located in the far south of the city, which
is mainly industrial. The validity of the instrument is tested using the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (Durbin,
1954; Wu, 1973; and Hausman, 1978), and the null hypothesis of obtaining consistent estimates under OLS
is rejected5
The distribution of the housing price premium is defined as the appreciation of housing prices in 2005
over their assessment values of 2000. The problem with using assessment values to define the price premium
is that high-value dwellings have lower assessment values than low-value dwellings (McMillen, 2011), biasing
of new conservation plans for the neighborhood directly influencing the urban renovation process.
5I use the Stata code developed by Baum et al. (2007)
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the gentrification effects on the price appreciation. I calculate the median of the assessment ratio in 2000
for each neighborhood and categorize the neighborhoods by quartiles depending on their ratio level. These
assessment ratio quartiles are included as control variables in the quantile regressions to reduce bias.
I use parametric and non-parametric quantile regressions to test the effect of gentrification in differ-
ent percentiles of the distribution. The parametric or conventional quantile regression assumes that the
gentrification variable is exogenous. The model is specified as follows:
(βτ , ατ ) = argminβ,α
∑
ρτ (Pij −Xiβ1 − Yjβ2 −Gjα) , (2.1)
where Pij is the log of the premium of the price of house i located in neighborhood j in 2005 over its
assessment value in 2000, Gj is a dummy variable with a value of one if the neighborhood j was gentrified.
Yj is a matrix of controls at the neighborhood level such as the level of income in 1990 and the assessment ratio
quartiles for 2000. Finally, Xi is a matrix of covariates composed of the structural housing characteristics,
distance variables and geographical areas fixed effects. The regression is estimated at different levels of the
housing price premium distribution, and coefficients are reported for percentiles τ = 0.05, τ = 0.50 and
τ = 0.95.
To correct for the bias generated by the endogeneity of the gentrification definition, I use the methodology
developed by Abadie et al. (2002) to estimate quantile treatment effects (QTE) with conditional endogenous
treatments. The model is defined as follows:
(βτ , ατ ) = argminβ,α
∑
κ(G,Z,X)ρτ (Pij −Xiβ1 − Yjβ2 −Gjα) , (2.2)
where κ(G,Z,X) = 1− Gj(1−Zj)Pr(Z=1|Xi) −
(1−Gj)Zj
Pr(Z=1|Xi) . The instrument Z is a binary variable which is constructed
using the proximity of the neighborhood to an Alderman’s ward office. When Gj = Zj , κ is equal to one,
and the parameter α is the same as when the treatment is exogenous; otherwise κ is negative. In order to
avoid using negative weights, κ(.) is transformed to κv = E[κ(G,Z,X)], which is a nonnegative conditional
probability.
Finally, the third model specification accounts for the presence of spatial autocorrelation between housing
units. The housing price of a specific dwelling could be affected by the prices of properties located in close
proximity. The kernel weighted quantile regression considers the nonlinearities in the quantile regression
caused by an unknown spatial structure in the model. The explanatory variables are weighted with weights
defined by the kernel density function (McMillen, 2010). The kernel used is the Epanenchnikov kernel density
10
function defined as:
K(d) =
3
4
(1− d2) ∗ I(|d| < 1), (2.3)
using distance to the city center, d, as the weighted variable. The model specification is the following:
(βτ , ατ ) = argminβ,α
∑
wi(d)ρτ (Pij −Xi(di − d)β1 − Yj(di − d)β2 −Gj(di − d)α) , (2.4)
where wi(d) is the weighting function defined by the kernel function, wi(d) = K((di − d)/h)/h. The
bandwidth or window size, h, is chosen to have a smooth quantile function: a large h produces too much
smoothing, and a small h introduces too much variability relying on too few observations (Koenker, 2005, p.
223). According to McMillen (2011), there is no significant difference between estimating the nonparametric
quantile regression by directly using kernel density estimations or by weighting the parametric quantile
regression by a kernel density function. Figure 2.5 shows the kernel density functions for the whole sample
as well as for a sample that includes only the neighborhoods that belonged to the three lowest income
quintiles in 1990, respectively.
The models in equations 2.1, 2.2 and 2.4 are estimated considering both (a) all the housing transactions
in the city of Chicago and (b) only the housing transactions of neighborhoods belonging to the three lowest
income quintiles in 1990. The former allows the comparison of housing price appreciation between gentrified
neighborhoods and high-income stable areas located mostly at the north of the Loop. The latter compares
gentrified neighborhoods only with similar neighborhoods that had the same level of income before the
gentrification process.
2.3 Description of the data
The demographic and income variables used in the model were obtained from the Neighborhood Change
Database (NCDB) provided by Geolytics. The data set contains social, demographic, economic and housing
data by census tract, county and state levels for the U.S. Individual housing transactions, including their
characteristics, price, and month and year of sale were provided by the Illinois Department of Revenue and
compiled by McMillen (2008). The housing information is available from January 1983 until December
2006. In this study, the housing sales for 2005 are used and compared to their assessment values of 2000.
Year 2005 is chosen because it is the year before the beginning of the housing crisis. Although it would be
interesting to observe the effects of gentrification over a longer period of time, choosing housing prices from
years after 2005 would necessarily include the housing crisis effects of 2007 in the estimations, which would
11
cause difficulty in isolating gentrification effects from crisis effects.
The Assessor’s Office conducts assessments in Cook County, and assessments should be 16% of the value
of the property. . However, in 2009, the target assessment was changed to 10% because most of the properties
were under-assessed (Weber and McMillen, 2010). In this paper, I use the assessment values from 2000 for
housing sales of 2005. Additionally, I calculate the assessment ratio by neighborhood in 2000 to control for
non-uniform assessment values for low- and high-value properties.
There are two units of analysis in the econometric models: the first, used to define gentrified neighbor-
hoods, is the neighborhood level measured by census tracts. Census tracts are the smallest unit of analysis
provided by the Census and are the best proxy for measuring neighborhood effects (Tatian, 2003). The
second, used for the quantile regression analysis, is individual housing prices. By using “individual” obser-
vations instead of “aggregate” variables by neighborhood, it is possible to analyze the behavior of the price
distribution.
Table 2.1 shows a description of the main variables including the number of building permits approved for
residential alterations and the changes in income from 1990 to 2000 weighed by the proportion of migrants.
The total number of individual housing transactions is 16,103 distributed in 738 city tracts.6 Statistics
are presented for the whole sample, the subsample of gentrified neighborhoods and the subsample of non-
gentrified neighborhoods. The differences in samples and their corresponding t-statistic are shown in columns
E and F. The gentrified neighborhoods account for 12.19% of the total city neighborhoods and 26.78% of
the neighborhoods belonging to the three lowest income quintiles in 1990.
Differences in means between gentrified and non-gentrified neighborhoods are significant and contain the
expected signs for most of the variables considered. With the exception of the structural characteristics of
the properties, most of these differences are statistically significant at the 95% level when comparing the
gentrified neighborhood sample with the two non-gentrified neighborhood subsamples (neighborhoods in the
whole city and neighborhoods belonging only to the three lowest quintiles in 1990).
Properties in gentrified neighborhoods have, on average, higher prices than in non-gentrified neighbor-
hoods, and this difference is significant when comparing them to the prices of all the neighborhoods in the
city as well as the prices of only the neighborhoods from the low income quantiles in 1990. Their assessment
value was also higher in 2000, suggesting that the appreciation of housing values started before 2000 and
continued to 2005 when the housing prices were reported.
The variables used to define gentrification also have higher values, on average, in gentrified than in non-
gentrified neighborhoods. The average number of permits authorized for housing renovation from 1993 to
6Only tracts with housing transactions in 2005 were included in the analysis. The total number of tracts in the city of
Chicago are 1,848.
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2000 was 30.37. This number decreases to 19.89 in non-gentrified neighborhoods belonging to the whole city,
and 8.97 in non-gentrified neighborhoods belonging to the lowest income quintiles in 1990. The increase in
income weighted by the number of migrants is also greater in gentrified neighborhoods, showing an increase
of 2.01 on average, while this increase is only 0.85 in the non-gentrified neighborhoods.
Gentrified neighborhoods are also closer to the CBD on average and have properties older than the
other neighborhoods in the city, but newer than the properties of neighborhoods belonging to the lowest
income quintiles in 1990. According to Helms (2003), Mendelsohn (1977) and Chinloy (1980), building age
increases the probability of housing renovation. Then we could expect gentrified neighborhoods to have
older properties than non-gentrified neighborhoods. Other housing structural characteristics such as area
built, number of bedrooms, whether the property has central air, a basement or attic, do not have significant
differences when comparing the means between gentrified and non-gentrified neighborhoods.
2.4 Analysis of the results
Results for the conventional quantile regression, QTE estimates and weighted kernel quantile regressions
are shown in table 2.2. Whether the whole sample is used, or only the neighborhoods belonging to the
three lowest income quintiles in 1990, conventional quantile regression estimates show that housing prices
in gentrified neighborhoods appreciate faster than in non-gentrified neighborhoods, but this appreciation is
much larger above the median than below it. The premium of the .95 quantile is 30 percent larger in gentrified
neighborhoods when compared to the whole sample, while this figure is only 10 percent in the .05 quantile
of the premium. In the case where the gentrified neighborhoods are compared only to neighborhoods that
belonged to the three lowest income quintiles in 1990, gentrification increases the premium by 28 percent in
the .95 quantile, while this increase is only 14 percent in the .05 percentile.
Quantile regression coefficients usually do not have a causal interpretation, and they only provide a com-
parison of the housing price premium distribution for gentrified and non-gentrified neighborhoods (Abadie
et al., 2002). The QTE estimates correct for this possible endogeneity and are shown in column B. I used
the methodology proposed by Froelich and Melly (2010) for the implementation of the QTE and for the
estimation of κ(G,Z,X). As mentioned previously, the gentrification dummy is instrumented using the
proximity of a neighborhood to a ward office.7
QTE estimates support the results obtained by the conventional quantile estimates: properties in gen-
trified neighborhoods appreciate faster than properties in non-gentrified neighborhoods from 2000 to 2005.
7For the estimation of the QTE, the instrumental variable must be a binary variable. Thus, a neighborhood receives a value
of 1 if it is adjacent to a neighborhood where a ward office is located and a value of zero otherwise.
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However, two differences are observed when the QTE estimates are compare to the conventional quantile
regression estimates. First, when the entire sample is considered, the difference in appreciation between the
lower and the upper tail of the price premium distribution is not economically significant. While the effect of
gentrification in the .95 of the premium is 62 percent, this effect is 60 percent in the lower tail. Second, when
gentrified neighborhoods are compared only to low-income neighborhoods in 1990, the differences between
appreciation in gentrified and non-gentrified neighborhoods in the lower tail of the premium distribution
is not statistically significant, suggesting that low-value dwellings in gentrified neighborhoods have a prices
appreciation of low-value dwellings similar to the appreciation of low-value dwellings located in low-income
neighborhoods that were not gentrified.8
Finally, model 3 shows the kernel weighted quantile estimates correcting for the spatial dependence of
housing prices. The standard errors in every percentile are similar to the standard errors obtained with
the conventional quantile regression as well as the goodness-of-fit of the regression. However, the estimates
are greater in magnitude and statistically significant at the 95% level, suggesting that the appreciation of
housing prices is correlated in space. For example, the appreciation of a property increase the likelihood that
other nearby properties will appreciate. According to the estimates of column C, properties in gentrified
neighborhoods appreciate 5 percentage points more in the lower tail of the distribution when compared to
the conventional quantile regression estimates of column A. This difference is reduced to 2 percentage points
in the middle and 3 percentage points in the upper tail of the premium distribution.
The spatial dependence is stronger in the lower tail when comparing gentrified neighborhoods only with
low-income neighborhoods in 1990. Properties in gentrified neighborhoods appreciate by 9 percentage points
more when considering spatial dependence of the housing price premia.
Table 2.2 also reports some of the neighborhoods and housing characteristics included in the regressions.
In addition to the gentrification variable, the median of the assessment/price ratio of 2000 for each neigh-
borhood is also included to account for differences in the assessment process between low- and high-value
dwellings. According to the coefficients of the conventional quantile regression and the kernel weighted
regression, properties in neighborhoods with a greater assessment ratio in 2000 appreciate faster than prop-
erties in neighborhoods with low assessment ratios. The QTE estimates show a different pattern with very
low evidence of impact of the assessment ratio in 2000 in the appreciation of housing prices in 2005.
As expected, properties located closer to the city center (CBD) appreciate faster than properties located
farther away, suggesting the existence of housing revitalization closer to the CBD. Surprisingly, and as
8The standard errors of the QTE estimation are greater than the standard errors of the conventional quantile regression,
suggesting that the instrument does not completely explain the endogeneity of the gentrification definition. However, the
instrument is still exogenous and its theoretical justification is still valid.
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another indicator of the existence of revitalization, the .05 quantile of the housing premium is more affected
by the proximity to the CBD than the .95 quantile. For example, the kernel weighted estimate (standard
error) of the effect of distance from the CBD is 12.1 percent (.014) for the .5 quantile, while the corresponding
estimate for the .95 quantile is 7.3 percent (0.008).
Older properties do not appreciate faster than newer properties. Even if this coefficient were significant in
previous studies of housing renovation (see Helms, 2003), this characteristic is not economically significant in
explaining the distribution of the housing price premium. Although some of the coefficients in the different
specifications are negative and significant, the magnitude is too small to have an economic interpretation.
Although the data set used for this analysis does not provide information about the income and demo-
graphic characteristics of the homeowners, inference can be made when assuming a monotonic relationship
between housing prices and level of income. In other words, the results of this analysis can provide some
insight about the displacement of the low-income population from gentrified neighborhoods if we assume
that low-income households live in low-value dwellings, and high-income households live in high-income
dwellings. If the low-value dwellings appreciate with gentrification, low-income populations are displaced
from gentrified neighborhoods.
Nevertheless, because this appreciation is lower in the lower tail of the housing price premium distribution
than in the upper tail, the influx of high-income migrants is stronger than the low-income population
displacement, suggesting that the population in the gentrified neighborhood does not decrease, and some
mixed-income communities are created. By analyzing demographic characteristics from a post-gentrification
period, we can further investigate the creation of mixed-income communities. However, because the last
Census data available are from 2000, this paper cannot include an analysis of population change from the
1990s to 2005.
2.5 Conclusions
This analysis attempts to measure the effects of gentrification by evaluating the appreciation of housing
prices after five years of the gentrification process. Data from a longer period of time were not used because
the prices would show the effects of the housing crisis, thus making it difficult to isolate the previous effects
of gentrification from the effects of the crisis.
Whether or not the gentrification definition is endogenous, or whether or not the housing prices are
spatially correlated, estimates suggest that properties located in gentrified neighborhoods appreciate faster
than properties in non-gentrified neighborhoods, but this appreciation is lower in the lower tail of the price
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premium distribution than in the upper tail.
By assuming a monotonic relationship between housing prices and income, the results of this study
can be used to analyze the effects of gentrification in terms of population displacement. If gentrification
appreciates the prices of low-value dwellings, the low-income households would be displaced from gentrified
neighborhoods, increasing income segregation in the city. However, the appreciation of high-value dwellings
is greater than that of low-value dwellings, suggesting that the influx of mid- and high-income populations
is stronger than the displacement of low-income population, resulting in mixed-income communities being
created through the gentrification process.
The results of this paper challenge the notion of the negative effects of gentrification on housing segrega-
tion. If, to some extent, gentrification creates mixed-income communities when the mid- and high-income
gentrifiers move to the neighborhood, housing segregation in the city decreases. However, results might be
different if more aggregated locations are analyzed. Chicago is still experiencing high levels of segregation
at the inter-neighborhood level, and the displacement of the low-income population from gentrified neigh-
borhoods is a trend that must be watched carefully as a trigger for segregation. Racial and socioeconomic
segregation can be observed when comparing the northern side of the city to the southern side. Further
analysis is required for a deeper understanding of this issue.
This paper provides important insights into the consequences of gentrification, not only for the city of
Chicago, but also for every metropolitan area that has experienced gentrification processes. If high-value
dwellings are more appreciated than low-value dwellings in gentrified neighborhoods, gentrification could be
used as a market-driven housing policy. In addition, it could be compared to housing programs that aim to
reduce segregation and increase housing opportunities for low-income populations.
Further research is necessary to better characterize the variables associated with gentrification. Firstly,
because of data constraints, the assumption of monotonicity between income and housing prices had to be
employed. That is, higher-value houses are purchased by high-income populations. However, if information
of ethnicity and income is provided for each housing sale transaction, this exercise can be replicated without
using monotonicity assumptions and can test if, in effect, low income populations are not displaced from
gentrified neighborhoods. Secondly, if the gentrification definition is endogenous, even after using different
periods of time to generate a causal relationship, a better instrument of gentrification could be employed. The
higher standard errors in the QTE estimates suggest that the instrument is not decreasing the endogeneity
of gentrification with respect to the appreciation of housing prices, even if theoretically, the location of ward
offices is exogenous to the dependent variable.
As a robustness check, further work will replicate the results obtained in this paper using different defini-
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tions of gentrification and a different definition for the housing price premium. Characteristics of gentrified
neighborhood such as the proportion of the Hispanic population in the neighborhood, the proximity of the
neighborhood to high-income areas, and the number of projects built and demolished in the neighborhood
will be included in the definition of gentrification. With respect to the housing price premium definition,
the appreciation will be defined comparing the assessment values in both years (2000 and 2005) instead of
assessment values in 2000 and housing prices in 2005, and comparing the quantile estimates of this paper
with the OLS and 2SLS estimates using only the upper and the lower tail of the distribution. Finally, the
robustness of the results will be also tested by using different instrumental variables for gentrification, such
as the grid street structure of the city, or the proximity of a gentrified neighborhood to a neighborhood that
was gentrified in a previous period.
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Low income neighborhoods with housing renovation greater than the city median
±
Lake Michigan
Legend
renovation<city
renovation>=city
Figure 2.1: Low-income neighborhoods satisfying condition 1 and 2 (housing renovation). Neighborhoods
that had a number of building permits for residential alterations greater than the median of building permits
for the city.
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Low-income neighborhoods with a migrant income change greater than the city median
Lake Michigan
Legend
income change < city income change
income change >= city income change
±
Figure 2.2: Low-income neighborhoods satisfying condition 1 and 3 (migrant income). Their income growth
from 1990 to 2000, weighted by the proportion if immigrants, was greater than the median for the city.
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Gentrified neighborhoods
Lake Michigan
Legend
non-gentrified neighborhoods
gentrified neighborhoods
±
Figure 2.3: Gentrified neighborhoods that satisfy the three conditions of gentrification: combination of
housing renovation and change in migrant income.
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Gentrified neighborhoods and location of ward offices
Figure 2.4: Location of ward offices and gentrified neighborhoods.
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Figure 2.5: Kernel density functions. Panel a (left): kernel density using all the observations. Panel b
(right): kernel function using only the properties located in the lowest income neighborhoods in 1990.
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Chapter 3
A General Equilibrium Analysis of
Rural-Urban Migration with Illegal
Markets
3.1 Introduction
Since the 1950s, migration between rural and urban areas has been an important issue in developing
economies. Contrary to evidence observed in developed countries, rapid urbanization in developing coun-
tries has increased the income differentials between rural and urban areas, and has influenced the levels of
urban unemployment and underemployment. Non-economic conditions such as armed and social conflicts
have also increased the migration flows from rural to urban areas. In Colombia, for example, 29.1% of the
rural population (or 7% of the total population) suffers from displacement due to the existence of an armed
conflict and illegal drugs market (Ibanez and Velez, 2008). An analysis of migration should include the
non-economic factors that affect individuals’ migration decisions.
Lewis (1954) and Ranis and Fei (1961) provide a model to explain economic growth based on the devel-
opment of the modern industrial sector. Todaro (1976) and Harris and Todaro (1970) explain the migration
decision between rural and urban areas with the existence of unemployment in cities. Several authors
have extended the Harris-Todaro model. Cole and Sanders (1985), Chaudhuri (1989) and Brueckner (1990)
include the informal sector in a general equilibrium analysis with rural-urban migration using different the-
oretical frameworks. Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) treat urban wages as endogenous variables, giving birth
to the efficiency-wage models. Layard et al. (1991) explain the migration decision as the tradeoff between
higher wage differentials or lower unemployment: if the wage differential is excessive, rural-urban migration
will continue until urban unemployment is sufficient.
Chaudhuri and Mukhopadhyay (2009) summarize the different extensions of the Harris-Todaro model
(including the models developed by Marjit and Beladi, 1996; Gupta, 1993; and Chaudhuri, 2000). They
analyze the effects of trade liberalization, subsidies given to the urban sectors and rural development on
unemployment and welfare. Zenou (2011) develops a general equilibrium model with two sectors and unem-
ployment in order to analyze the effects of decreasing unemployment benefits or subsidizing unemployment
on reducing urban unemployment. However, neither the Harris-Todaro model nor any of its extensions
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-which include the informal sector- are able to provide a complete explanation of the migration phenomenon
when non-economic variables affect migration decisions.
In this paper, we use a different extension of the Harris-Todaro model. In the case of Colombia, non-
economic variables such as violence are related to a sector that produces and exports illegal drugs. The utility
of workers employed in this sector is affected negatively by the fact that they are afraid, and feel guilty about
doing something illegal. This disutility received in the violence sector affects the spatial equilibrium and
allocation of workers. Some of them may migrate to cities, even if the money wage received in the violence
sector is greater than that in the urban sector. Under this framework, we explain the allocation decision of
workers under the existence of non-economic factors.
An increase in the minimum wage in manufacturing has ambiguous effects on manufacturing labor and
on violence labor, depending on the initial conditions of the economy. In some cases, a rise in the manu-
facturing wage increases the labor force in the city and reduces the violence sector labor. However, with
this manufacturing labor increase, city unemployment grows as well; thus, policy makers face a tradeoff
between decreasing violence and decreasing unemployment. In other cases, the rise in the manufacturing
wage exacerbates the conditions both in cities and in rural areas: unemployment and violence labor both
increase. In all cases, the initial level of violence has an inverse relationship with the changes in the violence
sector, and the initial level of unemployment has an inverse relationship with the changes in unemployed
labor. These results show that an analysis of the allocation of workers must consider non-economic factors
when the economy includes distortions such as unemployment and violence.
Although this exercise does not use real data, the socioeconomic situation of Colombia is a good applica-
tion for this theoretical model. Colombia is the number one producer of cocaine in the world, according to
the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC). The production of illegal drugs is related to the
armed conflict because the main producers of cocaine are the domestic illegal armed groups. Households in
the countryside have the option to work for this illegal sector and earn higher wages than in the traditional
agricultural sector, but with a higher probability of being incarcerated, kidnapped or killed. This “guilt and
fear” of doing something illegal negatively affects their utility, and in some cases they decide to migrate to
the cities, even knowing that earnings in the countryside are greater, and that the probability of obtaining
a job in the cities is reduced because of city unemployment.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 describes the general equilibrium framework in our version of
the Harris-Todaro model with unemployment and violence, and it describes the techniques used to linearize
and solve the system of equations. Section 3.4 analyzes the results under a simple case scenario where
the factor shares and the elasticities of substitution are the same for both sectors. Section 3.5 provides a
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sensitivity analysis using different values for the parameters of the model. Finally, section 3.6 provides some
concluding remarks and discusses policy implications about the existence of an illegal sector in a developing
economy with unemployment.
3.2 The general equilibrium framework
3.2.1 The basic model
This section describes a model for representing a small open economy with two sectors: a manufacturing
sector and a violence sector. The violence sector is located in the rural areas, while the manufacturing sector
is situated in urban areas. Workers are homogeneous and move among the two sectors until their utility is
equalized.
On the other side of the market, producers maximize profits and operate in perfect competition. Manu-
facturing goods are imported, produced domestically, and consumed domestically, while the violence sector
goods are produced domestically and exported. For trade balance, the value of manufacturing imports must
be equal the value of illegal exports. As a small open economy, prices of manufacturing and violence goods
are therefore fixed.
Urban areas have positive unemployment in the initial conditions of the economy, explained by the
existence of a minimum wage. In response to an exogenous shock, such as an increase in teh minimum wage,
unemployment levels increase or decrease depending on the movement of workers to and from the rural
areas. The rural areas labor clears the market using the wage as a mechanism, but in the violence sector,
the utility received by workers is not equal to the money wage. Violence workers face a disutility from being
employed in an illegal activity, and this disutility depends on is related to the amount of labor allocated to
the violence sector.
The model is used to analyze the effects of an exogenous change in the manufacturing sectors’ minimum
wage on the levels of employment in the two sectors, in the unemployed labor, and in the wages paid by the
different sectors. The main interest is to analyze whether the increase in the manufacturing wage raises the
level of unemployment in the cities while reducing the number of workers employed in the violence sector.
The model shows how the initial conditions of the economy affect the decisions of individuals to migrate from
rural to urban areas or vice versa, and it provides an explanation of the role of distortions in the migration
decision.
The general equilibrium framework includes two distortions, one in each sector. The two goods in the
economy are represented by a manufacturing good (M ) and a violence or illegal good (V ), each produced
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by a different sector. The factors of production are the manufacturing labor (LM ), violence labor (LV ),
manufacturing capital (KM ) and violence capital (KV ). The production function of the manufacturing and
violence products are given by:
M = M(LM ,KM ), (3.1)
V = V (LV ,KV ), (3.2)
and the factor endowments for the whole economy, considering also the unemployed labor, LU , are:
LM + LV + LU = L¯, (3.3)
KM +KV = K¯. (3.4)
Both factors are assumed to be mobile, but each sector has a different wage. For their migration decision,
workers react to the effective wages rather than the actual money wages. The effective wages consider
distortions in the economy such as unemployment in the city and the “fear and guilt” in the violence sector.
Equilibrium in the economy is reached when the effective earnings in each sector are equalized.
The effective manufacturing wage considers the unemployment in the cities. Defining the total city
labor force (LC) as the sum of the labor employed in the manufacturing labor and the unemployed labor
(LC = LM + LU ), the probability of employment is given by the fraction LM/LC ≤ 1. Assuming risk
neutrality, for simplicity, the expected wage in the manufacturing sector is also the effective wage, which we
then define as:
wM = wM
LM
LC
, (3.5)
where LMLC ≤ 1.
In the violence sector, workers receive disutility because of the fear and guilt of working for something
illegal. More hours working in the violence sector means a greater negative feeling and larger disutility. In
these cases, in terms of utility, the effective wage they receive for being employed in the violence sector is
not the monetary wage (i.e. wV ), but an effective wage (w

V ) that considers this disutility. This disutility
depends on the amount of labor in the violence sector, LV and so LV appears directly in the utility function.
Individuals choose LV the amount of manufacturing product consumed domestically, M
C to maximize:
L = U(MC , LV ) + δ
((
LM
LC
)
wM (L¯− LV ) + wV LV − PMMC
)
. (3.6)
Utility increases with the manufacturing good consumed ( ∂U
∂MC
> 0), and it decreases with labor in the
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violence sector ( ∂U∂LV < 0). The second argument in this utility function is not a purchased good, but rather,
it reflects the disutility from fear and guilt that depends on the amount of time spent working in the violence
sector. The marginal utility of income is defined by δ, and the term in parenthesis in equation 3.6 is the
income constraint. Individuals receive cash income by working in the violence sector and by working in the
manufacturing sector.1 However, because labor in the cities is not fully employed, the manufacturing earnings
are multiplied by the probability of employment already defined in equation 3.5, (LMLC ). The consumer’s first
order conditions are:
∂U
∂MC
= δPM , (3.7)
∂U
∂LV
= δ
(
LM
LC
wM − wV
)
. (3.8)
As mentioned above, in equilibrium, the effective wages in the violence and manufacturing sector are
equal. Define φ = −∂U/∂LVδ > 0 as the marginal disutility from fear and guilt from one unit of LV (converted
into a monetary measure when divided by the marginal utility of income). Rearranging terms in equation
3.8, the spatial equilibrium is achieved when:
LM
LC
wM = w

V = wV − φ. (3.9)
The elasticity of production in the manufacturing and the violence labor are defined as follows:
σM =
d(KM/LM )/(KM/LM )
d(wM/r)(wM/r)
, (3.10)
σV =
d(KV /LV )/(KV /LV )
d(wV /r)(wV /r)
. (3.11)
Perfect competition and constant returns to scale imply zero profit conditions given by equations 3.12
and 3.13:
PMM = wMLM + rKM . (3.12)
PV V = wV LV + rKV . (3.13)
The manufacturing imports are defined as M I . The total manufacturing consumption, MC , is then
defined as the sum of manufacturing imports and manufacturing product domestically produced:
MC = M +M I . (3.14)
1All workers are homogeneous. Because we do not know which one is working in the manufacturing sector, and which one
in the violence sector, the utility calculation effectively assumes that every person works part-time in each sector.
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We assume a small open economy, so prices PM and PV are fixed. We set PV = PM to fixed world prices
and treat this fixed relative price as numeraire. Trade balance is characterized by:
PV V = PMM
I . (3.15)
As noted by equation 3.6, consumers only consume manufacturing product (MC) because the violence
product is totally exported. Hence, we do not need to define the elasticity of substitution in utility, because
only one good is considered in the utility of consumers. The equations above represent an economy with
two sectors, homogeneous labor and capital, and unemployment and violence as distortions. In the next
section, we linearize the model to create a linear system of equations that allows us to analyze the effects of
increasing the manufacturing wage on employment and prices.
3.2.2 Linearization of the basic model
Changes in the total city labor force can be derived by defining α = LU/LC as the proportion of city workers
unemployed, and (1− α) as the proportion of city workers employed in the manufacturing sector. The new
linearized equation is given by:
L̂C = (1− α)L̂M + αL̂U , (3.16)
where the hat represents proportional changes of the variable (i.e. L̂C =
dLC
LC
).
Taking logs at both sides of equation 3.5 and total differentiating the new log equation, changes in the
expected manufacturing wage are given by:
ŵM = ŵM + L̂M − L̂C . (3.17)
Similarly, changes in the expected violence wage are found by taking logs of both sides and total differ-
entiating equation 3.9:
ŵV = ψŵV − ηL̂V , (3.18)
where ψ = wVw
V
is just the ratio of the violence wage and the effective wage, and η = LVw
V
φ′ is the elasticity
of disutility with respect to LV .
2
In equilibrium, the effective wage in the manufacturing sector must be equal to the effective wage in the
2The parameter φ > 0 because it is defined as the marginal disutility generated by an extra hour worked in the violence
sector. From the consumers’ first order conditions, this disutility is defined as φ = wV −wV . By taking derivatives with respect
to LV we get
∂φ
∂LV
= − ∂w

V
∂LV
= φ′ > 0, given that ∂w

V
∂LV
< 0. Replacing φ′ in η we get η = LV
w
V
∂φ
∂LV
= LV
w
V
(− ∂w

V
∂LV
) > 0.
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violence sector. Then, equations 3.17 and 3.18 can be combined to describe the spatial equilibrium:
ŵM = ŵ

V . (3.19)
In the specific case of manufacturing, we differentiate the manufacturing production function of equation
3.1 to get:
dM = MLMdLM +MKMdKM , (3.20)
where MLM and MKM are first derivatives of M with respect to LM and KM , respectively. Dividing everything
by M and multiplying and dividing the first and second terms of the RHS by LM and KM , respectively:
M̂ =
LMMLM
M
L̂M +
KMMKM
M
K̂M . (3.21)
The firm’s first order conditions imply that wM = PMMLM and r = PMMKM . We then define
θM ≡ wMLMPMM and (1 − θM ) ≡ rKMPMM as the shares of labor and capital in the production of the manufac-
turing good. Using these definitions, we rewrite equation above as follows:
M̂ = θM L̂M + (1− θM )K̂M . (3.22)
Analogously:
V̂ = θV L̂V + (1− θV )K̂V . (3.23)
Similarly, the shares of labor and capital from the total endowments used by the two sectors can be
obtained by differentiating equations 3.3 and 3.4. Here the example is shown for the labor equation:
LM
L¯
dLM
LM
+
LV
L¯
dLV
LV
+
LU
L¯
dLU
LU
= 0, (3.24)
Define λLM ≡ LML¯ , λLV ≡ LVL¯ , and λLU ≡ LUL¯ as the shares of manufacturing labor, violent labor, and
unemployed labor from the total amount of labor in the economy, and rewrite equation above using these
shares as follows:
λLM L̂M + λLV L̂V + λLU L̂U = 0. (3.25)
A similar linear equation for changes in capital is obtained by differentiating equation 3.4 and defining
λKM ≡ KMK¯ , and λKV ≡ KVV¯ as the shares of manufacturing and violence capital from the total amount of
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capital in the economy:
λKM K̂M + λKV K̂V = 0. (3.26)
The shares of labor sum to one as do the shares of capital:
λLM + λLV + λLU = 1, λKM + λKV = 1. (3.27)
Rearranging and solving for K̂M − L̂M in equation 3.10, the behavioral equation for the manufacturing
sector is obtained:
K̂M − L̂M = σM (ŵM − r̂), (3.28)
Similarly, the behavioral equation for the violence sector using the elasticity of production of equation
3.11 (σV ) and solving for K̂V − L̂V is:
K̂V − L̂V = σV (ŵV − r̂). (3.29)
Total differentiating equations 3.12 and 3.13, and using the factor shares θM , and θV , the following linear
equations are found:
M̂ + P̂M = θM (L̂M + ŵM ) + (1− θM )(K̂M + r̂), (3.30)
V̂ + P̂V = θV (L̂V + ŵV ) + (1− θV )(K̂V + r̂). (3.31)
We define γ = M I /MC as the imports share of manufacturing consumption, and (1− γ) as the share of
domestic production from manufacturing consumption, M /MC . Then, we total differentiate equation 3.14
to get:
M̂C = γM̂ I + (1− γ)M̂. (3.32)
The equation above describes how the consumption of manufacturing (MC) changes when the production
of manufacturing (M) and the manufacturing imports (M I) change away from their initial shares. Because
prices of manufacturing and violence are set fixed to world prices, the value of the total exports (V ) would
be equal to the value of the total imports (M I), and the equation above can be rewritten as:
M̂C = γV̂ + (1− γ)M̂. (3.33)
The linear system is composed by 13 equations (3.16, 3.17, 3.18, 3.19, 3.22, 3.23, 3.25, 3.26, 3.28, 3.29,
3.30, 3.31 and 3.33) and 16 unknowns (L̂M , L̂V , L̂U , L̂C , K̂M , K̂V , ŵM , ŵ

M , ŵV , ŵ

V , r̂, M̂ , V̂ , M̂
C ,
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P̂M and P̂V ). Changes in the manufacturing wage (wM ) are determined exogenously. Additionally, as
mentioned above, P̂M = P̂V = 0. With an exogenously determined manufacturing wage, and with the prices
of manufacturing and illegal goods as numraire, the system of equations is composed by 13 linear equations
and 13 unknowns, and can be solved by successive substitution.
3.3 Solution for factor prices and levels of employment
The calculation of the return of capital is obtained by first substituting equation 3.22 into equation 3.30
and solving for r̂. For obtaining ŵV this result is then used in equation 3.31 once equation 3.23 has been
substituted there. The solutions for these first two variables are the following:
r̂ = − θM
(1− θM ) ŵM , (3.34)
ŵV =
(1− θV )θM
θV (1− θM ) ŵM . (3.35)
The manufacturing product uses only labor and capital for its production. Given that the price of the
manufacturing product is fixed, and firms must break even in competitive equilibrium, any increase in the
manufacturing wage must be accompanied by a fall in the price of capital (r̂). A similar situation is observed
in the violence sector. With a fixed price of the violence product and r̂ determined in the manufacturing
sector, a reduction in the return to capital must increase the violence wage (or vice versa).
The changes in the exogenous prices (P̂M = P̂V = 0), the change in the exogenously determined ŵM , and
the calculation of r̂ and ŵV provide the solution for all the changes in the five prices in the economy. For
the calculation of the levels of employment in the manufacturing and violence sectors, we reduce the system
to a new system of equations with three equations and three unknowns. The first equation is obtained by
substituting equations 3.16, 3.17 and 3.18 into equation 3.19, solving for L̂U , and substituting it finally into
equation 3.25 to get:
(λLM + λLU )L̂M +
[
λLV α+ λLU η
α
]
L̂V +
λLU [θV (1− θM )− ψ(1− θV )θM ]
αθV (1− θM ) ŵM = 0 (3.36)
The second equation is obtained by solving for K̂M and K̂V in equations 3.28 and 3.29, respectively, and
substituting these values into equation 3.26:
λKM L̂M + λKV L̂V +
λKMσMθV + λKV σV θM
θV (1− θM ) ŵM = 0 (3.37)
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Finally the third equation is obtained by replacing K̂M and K̂V in equations 3.22 and 3.23, respectively,
and these two into equation 3.33:
M̂C = γL̂V + (1− γ)L̂M + γσV (1− θV )θM + (1− γ)σM (1− θM )θV
θV (1− θM ) ŵM (3.38)
Equations 3.36, 3.37 and 3.38 constitute a linear system of three equations with three unknowns (L̂M ,
L̂V , and M̂
C). Substitutions techniques are used again to solve for L̂M , L̂V , which are the variables of
interest to understand labor allocation:
L̂M =
λLUλKV [θV (1− θM )− ψ(1− θV )θM ]− (λLV α+ λLU η) [λKMσMθV + λKV σV θM ]
θV (1− θM )λ∗ ŵM , (3.39)
L̂V = (
α(λLM+λLU )(λKM σMθV +λKV σV θM )
λ∗θV (1−θM )
−λLU [θV (1−θM )−ψ(1−θV )θM ][αλKV (λLM+λLU )+λ
∗]
(λLV α+λLU η)θV (1−θM )λ∗
)ŵM ,
(3.40)
where λ∗ = (λLV α+ λLU η)λKM − αλKV (λLM + λLU ).
3.4 Interpretation of the results
3.4.1 Relationship between λs, θs, α and the size of the manufacturing sector,
β
To interpret the results, we first need to understand the relationship between λKM , λKV , λLM , λLV and
λLU with θM and θV . In the initial equilibrium, the total income produced by the manufacturing and the
violence sector must be equal to their total expenses on labor and capital. Assuming that initial prices are
equal to one, the equilibrium in the economy can be illustrated using table 3.1, where β ≡ MM+V is the size
of the manufacturing sector, and (1− β) ≡ VM+V is the size of the violence sector. The manufacturing and
violence sectors use labor and capital for their production, but labor can also be unemployed as shown by
the third row of table 3.1.
The total income from manufacturing is equal to the proportion of manufacturing product in the economy,
β, when the total income in the economy is normalized to one. From this amount, θM is spent on labor,
and (1 − θM ) is spent on capital, as shown by the first and second columns of the “manufacturing” row.
Analogously, a proportion of θV from the total violence in the economy (1 − β) is spent on labor, and a
proportion of (1− θV ) from the total violence product is spent on capital, as shown by the first and second
columns of the “violence” row. Additionally, labor is not only used by the manufacturing and violence
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sectors, but it can be also unemployed as shown in the third row of the table. Since α is the proportion of
city labor that is unemployed, and (1−α) is the proportion of manufacturing labor from the total city labor
force, we use cross multiplication to determine the amount of unemployed labor, which is shown in the first
column of the “unemployed” row: if βθM of the total labor belongs to the manufacturing labor, and this
amount corresponds to (1−α) of the city labor force, how much of the total labor in the economy would be
unemployed, if a proportion α of the city labor force is unemployed? Defining the unemployed labor force
as x, the first column of the third row is found by solving for x in the following equation:
βθM
x
=
1− α
α
(3.41)
Considering the definitions for λLM , λLV and λLU as the shares of labor, and λKM and λKV as the
shares of capital, these expressions can be derived from the relationships shown in table 3.1. For example,
λLM is the proportion of manufacturing labor (first column from the “manufacturing” row), from the total
labor in the economy (first column of the “Total Uses”). Similarly, λKV is the proportion of capital used by
the violence sector (second column of the “violence” row) from the total amount of capital in the economy
(second column of the “Total Uses”). These relationships are expressed as follows:
λLM =
βθM
βθM + (1− β)θV + βθMα/(1− α) (3.42)
λLV =
(1− β)θV
βθM + (1− β)θV + βθMα/(1− α) (3.43)
λLU =
βθMα/(1− α)
βθM + (1− β)θV + βθMα/(1− α) (3.44)
λKM =
β(1− θM )
β(1− θM ) + (1− β)(1− θV ) (3.45)
λKV =
(1− β)(1− θV )
β(1− θM ) + (1− β)(1− θV ) (3.46)
Before plugging these definitions into the solutions for r̂, ŵV , L̂M and L̂V , section 3.4.2 simplifies these
expressions by assuming that the share of labor in manufacturing is the same as the share of labor in the
violence sector, and that the two sectors have the same elasticity of substitution.
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3.4.2 Special case: Same factor shares for manufacturing and violence
(θM = θV ) and same elasticity of substitution (σM = σV )
By assuming that the share of labor in manufacturing is the same as the share of labor in the violence sector,
and that the two sectors have the same elasticity of substitution, the expressions in equations 3.42 to 3.46
can be simplified as follows:
λLM =
β(1− α)
β + (1− β)(1− α) , (3.47)
λLV =
(1− β)(1− α)
β + (1− β)(1− α) , (3.48)
λLU =
αβ
β + (1− β)(1− α) , (3.49)
λKM = β, (3.50)
λKV = (1− β). (3.51)
These relationships are then substituted into the solutions for the changes in the violence wage, the return
to capital, the manufacturing labor and the violence labor, facilitating the interpretation of the results. Using
θ as the share of labor in both sectors and σ as the elasticity of substitution in both sectors, the simplified
equations for ŵV , r̂, L̂M and L̂V are the following:
r̂ = − θ
(1− θ) ŵM , (3.52)
ŵV = ŵM , (3.53)
L̂M =
σ [(1− α)(1− β) + βη]
β(1− θ) [α(1− β)− βη] ŵM −
(1− β)(1− ψ)
α(1− β)− βη ŵM , (3.54)
L̂V =
β(1− ψ)(1− θ)− σ
(1− θ) [α(1− β)− βη] ŵM . (3.55)
We then use equations 3.54 and 3.55 to find a simplified solution for the change in the unemployed labor:
L̂U =
σ(1− α)
αβ(1− θ) ŵM . (3.56)
Since the firms in the manufacturing industry must break even, and the price of output is fixed as
numeraire, the government’s increase in the minimum wage paid to labor necessitates a fall in the return to
capital of a particular size. Because the return of capital is the same for the manufacturing and the violence
sector, its reduction increases the wage in the violence sector. With the same factor shares in each sector,
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the increase of the violence wage is the same as the increase in the manufacturing wage. Given that wages in
both sectors rise, the changes in the violence and manufacturing labor demands are ambiguous and depend
on the initial conditions of the economy.
An increase in the manufacturing wage always increases unemployment in the cities, either because
workers are laid off from their manufacturing jobs, or because the higher wage attracts workers from the
other sector. This increase is smaller with high levels of initial unemployment (α). The incentives to migrate
to the city caused by an increase in the manufacturing wage are smaller when the initial unemployment is
high. Then, the increases in unemployed labor, caused by the increase in the manufacturing wage are not
as large as when the initial unemployment is low.
A similar situation is observed with the changes in the manufacturing labor due to an increase in the
manufacturing wage. When the initial unemployment is high, then the increase in the minimum manu-
facturing wage results in less migration from the violence sector to the cities. As a result, changes in the
manufacturing labor are lower when starting with high levels of initial unemployment. On the contrary, the
violence labor becomes more attractive with high levels of initial unemployment: not only does the violence
wage increase in tandem with the increase in the manufacturing wage, but the labor in the violence sector
is also fully employed.
The parameter ψ tells us the size of the initial gap is between the initial monetary violence wage (wV )
and the initial expected violence wage (wV ). A larger gap is associated with greater levels of initial violence,
because workers receive greater disutility for being employed in an illegal activity. The parameter η is the
elasticity of disutility with respect to labor in the violence sector. It can be inelastic (less than one) or elastic
(greater than one), depending on how much the utility is affected by changes in the violence labor. While ψ
is related to the initial levels of the monetary and expected violence wage, the parameter η is related to the
size of the changes in the violence labor.
An increase in the manufacturing wage produces larger changes in the violence labor with higher levels of
ψ and η. With an increase in the manufacturing wage, the incentives to migrate from the violence sector are
greater with high levels of initial violence. The disutility generated by working for something illicit makes
the manufacturing sector more attractive to violence workers than the violence sector. This situation is
observed by analyzing equations 3.54 and 3.55. The ψ parameter is greater than one because the effective
violence wage is lower than the monetary wage with the existence of violence. Then, the term (1 − ψ) is
negative. With an increase in the manufacturing wage, the parameter ψ affects positively the manufacturing
labor and negatively the violence labor, as observed in equations 3.54 and 3.55, respectively. When the
difference between the initial values of wV and w

V is large, an increase in the manufacturing wage increases
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the labor in the manufacturing sector and reduces the labor in the violence sector.
Equation 3.54 also shows that the changes produced by an increase in the manufacturing wage in the
manufacturing labor are greater when elasticity of disutility, η, is high. With an increase in the manufacturing
wage, greater values of η imply a larger numerator of the first term in equation 3.54, increasing the labor
in the manufacturing sector. However, the parameter η also enters into the denominator of the expression
of L̂M making the sign of equation 3.54 ambiguous. Manufacturing labor increases when the expression
(α(1 − β) − βη) is positive, and decreases when this expression is negative. The opposite situation is
observed in equation 3.55: with an increase in the manufacturing wage, changes in the violence labor are
positive when (α(1− β)− βη) is negative, and vice versa.
Let us analyze the plausible values of expression (α(1−β)−βη). When the initial size of the manufacturing
sector is the same as the initial size in the violence sector (β = (1−β)), whether the sign of L̂M is positive or
negative, depends on the values of α and η. The manufacturing labor increases when α > η, and decreases
when η > α. Although these terms are comparable arithmetically, they are not comparable economically.
While α is the initial proportion of unemployed labor in the cities, η is a disutility elasticity. Thus, assuming
that α > η does not mean that the initial level of unemployment is greater than the initial level of violence,
or vice versa.
The changes in the manufacturing labor also depend on the initial size of the manufacturing sector.
When the manufacturing sector is bigger than the violence sector, and most of the labor is employed there,
labor in the violence sector is more valuable because it is relatively more scarce. Therefore, when α = η, and
β > 1− β an increase in the manufacturing wage, and consequently in the violence wage, leads to increases
in violence labor and reductions in manufacturing labor.
These different scenarios are all plausible, and as we show in section 3.5, both distortions -unemployment
and violence- have similar effects in all scenarios. The effects on manufacturing and unemployed labor
caused by increasing the manufacturing wage are smaller with high initial levels of unemployment and are
intensified in the manufacturing labor with high initial levels of violence. These effects are reversed in the
violence sector: the consequences of increasing the manufacturing wage are intensified when the initial level
of unemployment is high, and the effects are weaker with high levels of initial violence. The next section
shows the results of a sensitivity analysis with different values for the parameters, and the consequences of
increasing the manufacturing wage in terms of unemployment and violence.
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3.5 Sensitivity analysis of the different scenarios
From equations 3.54 and 3.55 analyzed in section 3.4.2, we have shown that changes in the manufacturing
and the violence labor resulting from an increase in the manufacturing wage depend on the magnitudes of
the initial level of unemployment (α), the elasticity of disutility with respect to labor in the violence sector
(η), and the size of the manufacturing sector in the economy (β). The structure of the model, particularly
of the production functions (constant returns to scale and perfect competition) implies that ŵM = ŵV , so
both wages increase the same. Then, it is ambiguous whether LM or LV might increase or decrease. When
α > η and the size of the manufacturing sector is equal to the size of the violence sector, an increase in the
manufacturing wage increases the labor in the manufacturing sector and reduces the labor in the violence
sector. On the contrary, when α < η an increase in the manufacturing wage increases the labor in the
violence sector and reduces the labor in the manufacturing sector.
Figure 3.1 shows changes in labor of each sector (manufacturing, violence and unemployment) for an
increase in the manufacturing wage, given different levels of η. In the simulation, 20% of the city labor
force is initially unemployed (α = 0.2), and the factor shares for the violence and the manufacturing sectors
-as well as the elasticity of substitution- are 0.5. Parameter ψ is also fixed to 1.5, meaning that the initial
expected violence wage is 33% lower than the initial monetary violence wage. When η < 0.2, an increase in
that wage increases labor in the manufacturing sector, and reduces labor in the violence sector, as shown
in the left side of figure 3.1. This increase is greater with higher values of η, up to a point. Workers in the
violence sector are attracted to the cities because of the increase in the manufacturing wage. With a high
level of violence in the violence sector, the incentives to migrate to the cities are stronger, not only because
of the increase in the manufacturing wage but also because of the disutility resulting from working in the
violence sector. Unemployed labor increases with a rise in the manufacturing wage; this increase is the same
for different values of the elasticity of disutility, η.
The right side of figure 3.1 shows a situation in which the parameter η is greater than the parameter
α. The level of initial city unemployment is still 20%, but now the elasticity of disutility with respect to
labor in the violence sector is higher. When the manufacturing sector is the same size as the violence sector,
and η > α, an increase in the manufacturing wage decreases the manufacturing labor and increases the
violence labor. In this case, workers are moving from cities to the violence sector, attracted by the increase
in the violence wage. Although the sign of the changes in labor are opposite to the case when η < α, with
high initial levels of violence an increase of the manufacturing wage reduces less (or increases more) the
manufacturing labor, while increasing less (or reducing more) the violence labor.
In figure 3.2 we show how increasing the manufacturing wage affects the labor variables, with different
39
initial sizes of the manufacturing sector (more or less than 50% of the total economy). In every case, we fix
the initial level of unemployment to 20%, as well as the elasticity of disutility with respect to the violence
labor (α = η = 0.2).
Under the conditions described above, an increase in the wage in both sectors reduces the labor in the
violence sector, but only when the violence sector is larger than the manufacturing sector in the initial
equilibrium (β < 0.5). When the manufacturing sector is larger than the violence sector in the initial
equilibrium (β > 0.5), an increase in the wage reduces labor in the manufacturing sector and increases labor
in the violence sector. The unemployed labor always increases with a rise in the manufacturing wage, either
because of the workers migrating to the cities from the violence sector, or because workers are laid off from
the manufacturing sector. However, the increase in the unemployed labor is lower when the initial size of
manufacturing labor is larger than the size of the violence sector.
The interpretation of these results is related to the relative size of the sectors and their maximum
capacity. Wages in both sectors increase in the same proportion, and both sectors have distortions that
affect the allocation of workers. When β > 0.5, the increase in the manufacturing wage makes labor in the
violence sector become scarce and raises the wage there. Thus, given the increase in both wages, workers
will move to the violence sector where labor is scarce relative to labor in the manufacturing sector. In the
opposite situation, when the initial size of the violence sector is greater than the size of the manufacturing
labor, the scarcity of labor in the cities attracts workers from the violence sector, increasing not only the
labor in the manufacturing sector but also the unemployed labor.
Finally, let us analyze the results under different initial levels of city unemployment. In this case, we
assume that the size of both sectors is the same (β = 0.5), and we fix the elasticity of disutility with respect
to labor to 0.5 (η = 0.5). Again, the shock analyzed is an increase in the manufacturing wage. The changes
in the manufacturing, violence and unemployed labor are shown in Figure 3.3.
As expected, an increase in the manufacturing wage increases the unemployed labor, but the changes
are smaller when the initial equilibrium has high unemployment. The changes in the manufacturing and
the violence labor, with an increase of the manufacturing wage, depend on the initial levels of violence and
unemployment, and the initial size of the manufacturing sector. Workers laid off from the manufacturing
sector due to an increase in the manufacturing wage either become unemployed or migrate to the violence
sector. As a result, the unemployed labor and the violence labor increase. However, the situation is reversed
with higher levels of initial unemployment and lower levels of elasticity of disutility, η. In this case, with
an increase in the manufacturing wage, we still observe a negative relationship between the initial level of
unemployment and the changes in the manufacturing and the unemployed labor, but the changes in these
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variables are positive, suggesting that workers from the violence sector migrate to the cities after being laid
off due to the increase in the violence wage. The migration from the violence sector to the cities is lower
when the initial level of unemployment is extremely high and the changes in the labor variables are reduced
almost to zero.
In the three scenarios analyzed, where different values are assigned for the different parameters of the
model, the effect of the initial conditions on the economy is the same for the labor variables. Disregarding
the sign of the variable change, a high level of unemployment always reduces the incentives to migrate to
cities, even with an increase in the minimum wage. Therefore, the changes in the manufacturing labor and
the unemployed labor are less positive (or more negative) when the initial unemployment is high.
On the other hand, the elasticity of disutility with respect to violence labor -a parameter that measures
the effect of the violence labor in the utility- increases the migration incentives to the cities, even with high
levels of initial unemployment. With greater values of this elasticity (η), the changes in the violence labor,
due to an increase in the manufacturing wage, are more negative (or less positive), suggesting that even with
an increase in the violence wage, workers employed in the violence sector also consider the disutility caused
by fear and guilt, and decide to move to the cities, despite their suboptimal condition.
3.6 Conclusions and policy implications
This paper describes a general equilibrium model of an economy with two distortions: unemployment and
violence. Unemployment affects the effective wage perceived by the manufacturing workers because it reduces
the probability of employment in the cities. On the other hand, violence directly affects the utility of
individuals. By working in the violence sector, workers receive a disutilty related to the fear and guilt
of doing something illegal. Considering these two distortions, the model analyzes the workers’ allocation
decision between the manufacturing and the violence sectors.
Several conclusions can be drawn from this analysis, but the most important is that workers’ allocation
decisions cannot be understood simply by analyzing the wage differentials between regions. With an increase
in the manufacturing wage, the wage in the violence sector increases also. Our results suggest that changes
in the labor supplies in each sector depend on the initial conditions of the economy. A high initial level
of unemployment makes cities less attractive, even with a rise in the manufacturing wage. Manufacturing
labor increases are lower if initial unemployment is high; and manufacturing labor reductions are greater
with high initial unemployment. A similar situation is observed with the violence sector and the initial level
of violence. If an increase in the wage increases the violence labor, this increase is lower with high initial
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levels of violence. Similarly, if the increase in the wage reduces the violence labor, this reduction is greater
with high levels of initial violence.
Policy makers thus face a tradeoff when deciding to increase the manufacturing wage. In some cases,
depending on the initial conditions, such a policy will reduce the size of the violence sector, which is beneficial
for the economy; however, it will also increase unemployed labor by attracting more workers to the cities. In
other cases where both the unemployed and the violence labor increase, the policy would not be effective for
reducing either of the distortions. An effective solution to reduce both unemployment and violence would
be to reduce the manufacturing sector’s minimum wage, and, depending on the initial conditions of the
economy, both the unemployed and the violence labor could be reduced, while the manufacturing sector
grows and employs more workers.
In this paper, the policy analyzed is an increase in the manufacturing sector’s minimum wage, policy
that is imposed by the government, but implemented by the manufacturing firms. A more interesting policy
could be analyzed if the government is included in the model. For example, instead of imposing an increase
in the manufacturing wage, the government could provide subsidies to the manufacturing firms to increase
the wage. In this case, the subsidies should be financed by an increase in taxes only to the manufacturing
sector, given that the other sector in the economy is illegal, then it would not pay taxes. The model can also
be replicated by analyzing changes in the export price of the violence sector’s exports, or by “legalizing” the
sector and defining a tax structure for the manufacturing and the violence sector’s firms.
This model can be tested by using real data and by relaxing some of the assumptions. For example,
the unemployment could be understood as a national phenomenon instead of just an urban distortion. The
model could include also a third sector called Agriculture to observe rural allocation decisions within the same
region. Finally, the linkage between the manufacturing sector and the violence sector is determined not only
by the allocation of workers, but also by the external sector: the value of manufacturing imports is equal to
the value of the violence sector’s drug exports. In reality, the connection between manufacturing and illegal
drugs in not that tangible. In Colombia, some of the proceeds received by the illegal exports are reinvested
in the economy through money laundering. In other words, some manufacturing imports are bought with
illegal money and sold in the national economy. However, assuming that all the manufacturing imports are
bought with illegal drug money is an overstatement. Finally, it is worth to recognize an important limitation
of the analysis. The model is unfeasible when the size of the manufacturing sector is equal to the size of the
violence sector, and the parameters that define initial unemployment and initial violence are the same. In
this case the changes in the labor supplies go to infinitive and we are not able to provide an explanation of
the results. Future work will investigate this issue further.
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Table 3.1: The fraction of total income that is attributable to each factor in each sector.
Labor Capital Total Income
column 1 column 2 column 3
Manufacturing βθM β(1− θM ) β
Violence (1− β)θV (1− β)(1− θV ) (1− β)
Unemployment βθMα/(1− α) 0 0
Total Uses βθM + (1− β)θV β(1− θM ) + (1− β)(1− θV ) 1
+βθMα/(1− α)
For the total national income of 1.0, each cell shows the fraction of that income that is generated by the factor of
production of that column, employed in the sector of that row. Since β is the share of income in manufacturing
and θM is the share of manufacturing going to labor, the first cell shows that βθM is attributable
to labor in manufacturing. The third row of the first column is calculated by solving the following problem: if βθM
is the amount of labor used in the manufacturing sector, and this amount corresponds to a proportion of (1− α) of
the city labor, how much of the total labor is unemployed if the unemployment corresponds to a proportion of α of
the total city labor? Finally, the last row is just the sum of the columns.
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Figure 3.1: Changes in LM , LV and LU from a change in the manufacturing wage for different initial levels
of η on the horizontal axis (elasticity of disutility). Other parameters: α = 0.2, θ = 0.6, σ = 0.5, β = 0.5.
Figure 3.2: Changes in LM , LV and LU from a change in the manufacturing wage for different initial levels
of β on the horizontal axis (size of the manufacturing sector). Other parameters: α = 0.2, η = 0.2, θ = 0.6,
σ = 0.5.
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Figure 3.3: Changes in LM , LV and LU from a change in the manufacturing wage for different initial levels
of α on the horizontal axis (initial unemployment in the cities). Other parameters: β = 0.5, η = 0.5, θ = 0.6,
σ = 0.5.
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Chapter 4
What are the effects of having drugs
be illegal? A CGE microsimulation
model for Colombia
4.1 Introduction
Cocaine demand has increased worldwide since the 1970s, primarily in Europe and the U.S. According to a
2007 report by the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 5.7 million people in the U.S. have
used cocaine at least once. Worldwide, between 15 and 20 million people are considered cocaine users. The
main producers of cocaine are located in the Andean region of South America, including Colombia, Peru
and Bolivia, with Colombia being the main producing country. In Colombia, the production and trafficking
of cocaine and other drugs such as heroin are strongly related to the on-going civil war, deeply affecting the
socioeconomic welfare of the population. Although illegal drugs did not cause the war, they continue to play
an important role in perpetuating it by providing income for the purchase of weapons and other materials
(Angrist and Kugler, 2008).
This paper attempts to measure the effects of a worldwide legalization of drugs on household economic
welfare in Colombia, based on different assumptions about the termination of the armed conflict. The idea
behind the shock is to create a counterfactual to understand the effects of having drugs illegal, instead
of simulating a very unlikely scenario. Drug legalization could significantly contribute to ending the civil
war by greatly reducing the main source of rebel funding. This scenario is compared with one in which
the armed conflict continues after legalization. Such legalization would have to be a worldwide decision in
order to be beneficial to the Colombian economy. Otherwise, the most likely possible outcome of Colombian
drug legalization would be the movement of the black market to a neighboring country, a situation already
observed after the imposition of strict anti-drug policies in Peru.
Most of the existing literature measuring the economic impact of illegal drugs in Colombia uses an
econometric or partial equilibrium analysis. For example, Gibson and Godoy (1993) use a general equilibrium
approach to measure the effects of a rise in illegal drug price on the Bolivian economy. However, regarding
Colombia, no other study has used a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to measure legalization
impacts. Steiner (1998) uses production data to estimate the net income derived by the Colombian drug
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trade, while Dion and Russler (2008) use an econometric approach to study the relationship between coca
cultivation, displacement, poverty and government presence in coca-growing regions. Ibanez and Velez (2008)
calculate the welfare losses of the civil conflict and forced migration, but do not consider drug-legalization
scenarios. Mejia and Restrepo (2008) build a game theory model to evaluate the economic consequences
of the war on drugs and the “Plan Colombia”, a US$4.5 billion U.S. initiative from 2000 to 2005 to end
the armed conflict and eliminate drug trafficking (Veillette, 2006). Angrist and Kugler (2008) measure the
effects of prohibition in Colombia using the aerial bridge interdiction between Peru and Colombia as a quasi-
experiment, while Becker et al. (2006) compare the cost of prohibition with an optimal tax on consumption
to reduce the demand for drugs.
In contrast to the previous literature that used only partial equilibrium analyses, this work contributes
to the field through the development of a CGE model with microsimulations to simulate the microeconomic
effects of drug legalization, once all the sectors of the economy have been affected. The production side
of the economy is disaggregated such that the main sectors affected by the legalization can be analyzed,
and the demand side is disaggregated by location of households, urban and rural, and by income deciles in
each of these locations. Two econometric models are considered. The first is a labor participation model
estimating changes in the labor markets and migration flows. The second is an Almost Ideal Demand System
with censored data used to estimate the households’ demand, and to calculate welfare measures once the
CGE model has been calibrated. The possible effects of drug legalization on the country are replicated by
imposing several shocks to the economy.1
Six scenarios are analyzed with different assumptions about the legalization of drugs. In the first four,
the armed conflict ends with legalization and the government spends less money on security expenditures.
The scenarios vary depending on the movement of the export price of drugs, and on the reinvestment of
the security expenditures in other productive sectors such as health, education and transportation. The
last two scenarios assume that the armed conflict continues, so the government keeps investing in security
expenditures, but that the export price of drugs changes. In terms of economic welfare, the best scenarios are
when the armed conflict continues and the households benefit from the redirection of the “economy of war”
expenditures. These gains are not equally distributed among the population: the poorest households benefit
more than the richest households and rural areas receive greater gains than urban areas. When legalization
ends the armed conflict, welfare losses are observed in the highest income deciles if the government does not
reinvest the security expenditures in other productive sectors. If the government makes those reinvestments,
1Due to the lack of information about what would happen in a producer economy if drugs were to be legalized, these shocks
are based on assumptions made by the author given the available information. A sensitivity analysis of each of the assumptions
is conducted to analyze how different magnitudes in the changes of the parameters affect the results of the model.
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all households improve their economic welfare.
The paper is divided as follows. The first section presents a description of the role of illegal drugs in the
Colombian armed conflict and the subsequent socioeconomic consequences. Then, section 4.3 presents the
microeconomic models and their interaction with the CGE model. The CGE model and the shocks used to
simulate the four scenarios of legalization are explained in section 4.4, and results are shown in section 4.5.
Finally, section 4.6 provides some concluding remarks and policy implications of the legalization of drugs.
4.2 Role of the illegal drugs in Colombia
The civil war in Colombia began with the period known as La Violencia (1948-1957) during which the two
political parties engaged in a war for power. Following the Cuban revolution, several communist guerrilla
units were formed as a response to the political exclusion the country was facing. Illegal drugs began playing
an important role in the civil war in the mid-1960s when the domestic demand for marijuana created an
economic opportunity. Marijuana production intensified when the U.S. implemented eradication programs
in Mexico using herbicides and production moved to Colombia to supply the international demand (Thoumi,
2002).
Cocaine exports began in the mid-1970s. The exorbitant profits allowed traffickers to establish stable
routes and to connect the business with the main producers of coca leaves in Peru and Bolivia. The creation
of drug cartels in Colombia further expanded the business. Narcotraffickers used the “aerial bridge” to
transport coca paste from Peru to Colombia in order to be processed and trafficked to demander countries
(Mejia and Posada, 2007). In 1996, the Peruvian and U.S. governments authorized interdiction programs
to block the aerial bridge between the two countries. The flights between Peru and Colombia using the
air bridge were indeed reduced by 50%; however, cocaine production did not decrease, and a shift in the
organization took place, increasing prices in Colombia and stimulating the planting of coca crops in the
country (Angrist and Kugler, 2008).
The coca crops were grown in areas of the country with very limited state presence. Given the new sources
of revenue, the guerrillas exploited the opportunity of gaining additional funding by “taxing” the peasants
who grew coca. This tax and extortion system imposed by the guerrillas, and later by paramilitary groups, is
the main link between the civil conflict and the illegal drug markets (Angrist and Kugler, 2008). According
to Echeverry (2004), the guerrillas income between 1990 and 1996 was between US$370-680 million: 41%
of this was estimated to come from the illegal drug trade, 20% from extortion, and 39% from corruption
and investment. If the peasants refuse to pay the “drug taxes” to the guerrillas and paramilitaries, they are
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kidnapped, threatened or killed. For most of them, the only remaining option is to migrate to urban centers
and become part of the internally displaced population (IDP).
According to the U.S. Committee for Refugees, Colombia ranks among the top ten countries worldwide
in displaced population (see Engel and Ibanez, 2007; and Lozano-Gracia et al., 2010). Focusing on the
capital city, Bogot, of the 6.5 million population counted in the 2005 Census (DANE, 2010), 2.5 million were
internal immigrants. The internal displaced population has been estimated to be around 40,000 per year
according to official statistics produced by CODHES (2010).
The regions with the highest population displacement coincide with the highest production of coca.
These are located in the south and southeast of the country and in some areas in the West. This relation-
ship between displacement and the existence of illegal crops is well-documented by the literature. Dion and
Russler (2008) find a relationship between state presence, aerial eradication and displacement, and between
displacement and coca cultivation. Ibanez and Velez (2008) find a positive relationship between the prob-
ability of displacement and the presence of paramilitary and guerrilla groups, and a negative relationship
between the probability of displacement and the presence of military and police forces.
The internally displaced population is not the only socioeconomic consequence of the conflict. Tax revenue
not received because of the illegality of the market represents a significant loss for the government. Echeverry
(2004) estimates the net earnings of the drug business to be US$1.9 billion, corresponding to 2.3% of the
Colombian GDP, including costs of inputs, interdiction and money laundering. Following these calculations,
not only does the government not receive tax revenue, but the earnings are not being reinvested in the
country or redistributed among the population, especially among the rural households directly associated
with the production process.
The U.S. government has spent significant resources in Colombia trying to reduce the production and
trafficking of narcotics through the Plan Colombia. Even with the advances in illegal crop eradication,
drug consumption in the U.S. has not decreased, creating a question about the wisdom of the strategies to
eliminate the production of raw materials rather than attacking the commercialization of the final product.
Several authors have argued against illegal drug prohibition based on eradication policies. Attacking the
supply does not decrease consumption because the illegal drug demand is price inelastic (Echeverry, 2004).
Mejia and Posada (2007) argue that consumer countries should spend more money trying to reduce the
demand for illegal drugs within their borders, or legalize this use instead of investing in implementation of
anti-drug policies in producer countries. In the following sections, the Colombian economy under prohibi-
tion is compared with the same economy under legalization to evaluate household welfare impacts of the
legalization of drugs.
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4.3 Description of the microeconometric models
The literature describes several methods for introducing micro analysis into macroeconomic models. The
simplest is to introduce heterogeneous representative households in the CGE models (see Lofgren et al., 2003;
and Dervis et al., 1982). This approach has been criticized because it is not possible to model microeconomic
behavior within groups with just one representative household per group. In this case, all households must
have the same budget shares because the demand is not being estimated econometrically (Bourguignon et al.,
2008). To introduce household level data in macro models, three approaches have been suggested by the
literature: top-down (TD) modeling, bottom-up (BU) modeling, and feedback loops from bottom to top
(see Bourguignon et al., 2008 for a review).
In this paper, the drug legalization shock implemented at the macro level produces two main effects at the
micro level: (1) it affects migration flows between rural and urban areas, and between different urban labor
markets, and (2) it affects households’ economic welfare by changing prices and household expenditures. In
order to account for these micro effects, two microeconometric models are introduced in the analysis. The
first is a model of labor participation, which is linked to the CGE model using the feedback loops approach.
The second is a model of demand using the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS). The AIDS “feeds” the
CGE model before the introduction of the shock (BU approach), and the results of the CGE model are used
as inputs in the AIDS model to calculate welfare effects of the macro shock (TD approach). Figure 4.1 shows
the dynamics and the interaction between the three models.
4.3.1 The labor participation model
Both the labor participation model and the AIDS model use the Integrated Household Survey of Income and
Expenses (GEIH) of 2007 for Colombia. The Survey was conducted in both rural and urban areas and it
collects information about the demographics, income, expenses and labor characteristics of 64,119 different
households. Most of the information is available at the household level and disaggregated information is also
available for the household head. The labor participation model uses labor and demographic characteristics
of the household heads, assuming that the behavior of other household members is the same.
As mentioned above, the labor participation model is used to estimate the labor supplies for use in the
CGE model, and then the wage changes from the CGE model are used to calculate changes in labor supplies
and migration flows across different labor markets. This model follows the methodology used by Magnac
(1991), Cogneau and Robilliard (2006) and Savard (2003) for segmented labor markets. In this specific
case, the disaggregation is done not only in urban areas, but also includes rural areas. Three different labor
markets and unemployment are considered: rural labor, informal urban labor and formal urban labor.
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Table 4.2 shows a summary of the statistics of the labor market at the initial equilibrium: 45.80% of
the total households belong to the rural sector while 54.19% belong to the urban sectors. From the urban
households, 28.74% are unemployed, 30.95% belong to the informal sector, and 40.37% to the formal sector.
Rural workers have the lowest level of education, and most of the unemployed are women.
The highest wages are earned by the formal sector, followed by rural workers and informal workers.
Notice that the informal wages are lower than the rural wages, suggesting an incentive to migrate from
the urban informal market to the rural areas. However, in the case of Colombia, the armed conflict in
the countryside makes the rural areas less attractive, affecting the migration decisions of urban workers. To
determine how much informal workers would earn in rural areas, or rural workers in the urban labor markets,
a microeconomic model is needed to control for demographic and social characteristics of households.
Potential wages for each of the labor markets and reservation wages for the unemployed are calculated
using the Heckman two-step method with a biprobit estimation in the first step. The first step calculates
the probability of a worker living in rural or in urban areas, and the probability of being employed in any of
the intra-labor markets. The second step uses the Mills ratio of the first step in an ordinary least squares
estimation to estimate the potential wages of each of the workers in each sector given their demographic and
social characteristics. A detailed description of the model, and the estimates of the regressions can be found
in Appendix A.
Once the potential wages are calculated, the migration flows are defined by this scheme, following Cogneau
and Robilliard (2006) and Savard (2003):
1. The worker i chooses the rural sector if wRi > w
E
i .
2. The worker i chooses to be unemployed if w0i > w
R
i , w
0
i > w
I
i , and w
0
i > w
F
i − costf .
3. The worker i chooses the informal sector if w Ii > w
R
i , w
I
i > w
0
i , and w
I
i > w
F
i − costf .
4. The worker i chooses the formal sector if wFi − costf > wRi , wFi − costf > w0i , and wFi − costf > w Ii ,
where wRi is the rural potential wage of worker i ; w
0
i is the urban reservation wage of worker i ; w
I
i is the
informal potential wage of worker i ; and wFi − costf is the formal potential wage of worker i minus a cost
of entry to the formal market, which is also estimated econometrically. The definition of the expected wage
(wEi ) which enters into the migration decision of rural workers, follows Harris and Todaro (1970): it is equal
to the product between urban wages (both informal and formal wages) and the probability of getting a job
in the urban sector (in the informal and formal markets). Unemployment in both urban and rural areas is
considered in the migration decision.2
2Following official statistics and estimates by the author, an unemployment rate of 10% is considered in both areas.
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Simply by observing the wage differentials, we can see that most of the unemployed and informal workers
are better off in the rural areas than in the urban areas because their rural potential wage is greater than
their actual urban wage. Without considering the rural unemployment rate, in the case of the unemployed,
98% have higher potential rural wages than reservation wages. For the informal workers, 45.81% have higher
potential rural wages than current rural wages. This percentage is reduced to 28.71% in the case of formal
wages. This situation arises because the migration decision between rural and urban areas does not depend
only on economic factors, such as the probability of getting a job in urban areas and the wage differential,
but also on non-economic factors such as the threats they and their families receive from the guerrillas and
paramilitary groups.
The legalization of drugs leads to the cessation of the armed conflict in the first four scenarios considered.
Then, for modeling migration after the shock, the non-economic factors associated with the conflict do not
have to be taken into account. However, an initial equilibrium is estimated, where the workers select their
preferred labor market, taking into consideration the unemployment rates and the costs of entry into the
formal market. The interaction between the CGE model and the labor micro model is shown in figure 4.2.
Changes in labor supplies are included in the CGE model, wages are calculated again, and the participation
model is recalculated with the new wages until the model finds convergence. These feedback effects ensure
the reduction of the bias generated when only one iteration is considered (Bourguignon and Savard, 2008).
4.3.2 The Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS)
The second microeconometric model uses AIDS for the estimation of the consumer expenditure shares of
the CGE model. The advantage of using AIDS over other linear demand systems, such as the Cobb-Douglas
and the Linear Expenditure Function, is that price and income elasticities are not assumed to be the same
for all households. AIDS was developed by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a) as an alternative to the linear
and the translog models that dominated the literature at the time.
Additionally, this paper considers two modifications to the original AIDS specification: the first one is the
inclusion of a demographic component following the methodology developed by Ray (1983). The second one
is the estimation of the model using censored data following the two-step method proposed by Shonkwiler
and Yen (1999). A detailed description of these methodologies can be found in Appendix A. The modified
estimable share with censored data and demographic variables is the following:
si = Φ[αi +
∑m
j=1 γij log pj + (βi + θi1z1 + θi2z2 + θi3z3)(logw
−(9 + log(1 + ρ1z1 + ρ2z2 + ρ3z3) + log a))] + δφ,
(4.1)
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where log a = α0 +
∑m
i=m αi log pi +
1
2
∑m
i=1
∑m
j=1 γij log pi log pj .
The parameters of the model are α, β, γ, θ and ρ; si is the budget share of good i ; pi is the price of
good i ; and w is total expenditure. z1 , z2 and z3 are number of persons in the household, education of the
household head and location (rural or urban) of the household, respectively; and δ is an extra parameter
of the model with no restrictions. In order to maintain the additivity restriction of the shares, the system
estimates n-1 equations, where n is the number of shares, and the last share is recovered as a residual of the
n− 1 shares.
The GEIH registers household expenditures of 1,055,945 goods and services, but unitary prices are only
reported for the “food” category. Using price indices for 79 goods and services for low-, middle- and high-
income households, prices are recovered following the methodology described in Appendix A. A price index is
calculated following Urzua (2010) and the shares of the nine goods, and the total expenditures are recovered
for each of the households in the survey. The AIDS model is estimated using a non-linear seemingly unrelated
regression estimator (nlsur) where the shares are the dependent variables, and the prices, total expenditures,
sociodemographic characteristics and the density functions (φ) are the independent variables. Results and
details of this estimation are also found in Apprendix A.
The estimated shares are used as inputs in the CGE model and consumption is calculated using the
prices and expenditures of the macro variables. This methodology follows Savard (2010), who uses AIDS
for estimating the demand of a CGE model built for the Philippines. Because the GEIH does not provide
information about the consumption of illegal drugs, its domestic consumption behavior is assumed to be the
same as the consumption of tobacco and alcohol.
Once the CGE model is built and the shocks of legalizing drugs are calculated at the macroeconomic level,
the economic welfare measures (equivalent and compensating variations) are calculated using the parameters
of the AIDS model, changes in the income and prices of the CGE model, and recovering the expenditure and
utility functions for each of the household groups. The equivalent (EV) and compensating (CV) variations
are defined as follows:
EV (p0, p1, w) = e(p0, u1)− e(p1, u1) = e(p0, u1)− w, (4.2)
CV (p0, p1, w) = e(p0, u0)− e(p1, u0) = w − e(p1, u0), (4.3)
where e(pi , uj ) is the expenditure function estimated with prices i and utility j. The expenditure func-
tion is calculated using two different price indexes: log(a) which was defined before in equation 4.1, and
b(p) =
∏n
i=1 pi
βi .
The EV and CV give information about the losses or gains on welfare by a price increase. Specifically,
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the CV measures how much money the consumer would have to receive in order to offset the losses of the
price increase, while the EV measures how much money the consumer would have to give away in order to
have a loss equal to the price increase. Both measures answer the same problem: how much extra income is
needed in order to offset the price changes. Then, negative EV and CV mean that the consumer receives a
gain in economic welfare, and positive measures mean a loss in economic welfare.
4.4 Description of the CGE model: data used and simulations
4.4.1 Description of the data
The main source of data for the CGE model comes from the social accounting matrix (SAM). The SAM is
built following Corredor and Pardo (2008) using Colombian data from 2006. All the information required
for the construction of the aggregated SAM is provided by the Colombian National Department of Statistics
(Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica, or DANE) in three tables: the utilization matrix,
the supply matrix, and the general equilibrium matrix. The illegal drugs sector information and its linkage
with the legal economy are provided by an “enclave” account also reported by DANE.
The production side is disaggregated into an illegal drugs sector and ten legal sectors: food, housing,
clothing, health, education, culture, transportation (infrastructure), addictions (alcohol and tobacco), other
services and security. All products, excepting the security and health services, are both imported and
exported. The main exports come from the transportation and the food sectors (46% and 16% respectively),
while the export of illegal drugs represents only 3.37% of the total exports. The highest level of imports
is observed in the housing sector followed by transportation (44.35% and 17.93% of the total imports,
respectively).
The Quality of Life Survey for 2003, the 2005 Census and the GEIH, all conducted by DANE, are used
to disaggregate the factors of production and the demand side of the SAM. Corredor and Pardo (2008)
also provide tables explaining how this disaggregation is accomplished. Households are divided into income
deciles for both rural and urban areas, and labor is disaggregated into three different labor forces (rural
labor, urban informal labor and urban formal labor), and unemployment.
The disaggregated SAM is rebalanced using the RAS method first developed by Stone and Brown (1962).
Table 4.3 shows a simplified version of the 2006 SAM used as a benchmark economy for the development of
the CGE model. Households are the owners of the factors of production and receive money from them. The
illegal activity uses rural labor and a factor of production called the illegal factor which is not paid to the
households but to the rest of the world. This account is called income leakage and essentially represents the
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opportunity cost of the prohibition (money the households are not receiving because of the illegality of the
drugs).
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 show the factors demand and factors supply respectively disaggregated for household
types. Food, clothing, education, culture, transportation, alcohol and other services are considered capital-
intensive sectors. Health and security are labor-intensive sectors and most of the labor used comes from
the urban formal market. On the other hand, the urban informal market supplies most of the labor for
the clothing industry and cultural services. The illegal drugs sector uses primarily the illegal factor for its
production, but it also purchases 27.2% of their value added from rural labor. Most of the other activities
use primarily urban labor, with the exception of the food industry which uses 15.2% of rural labor.
The SAM is built in a way that the urban households only provide urban labor and the rural households
only provide rural labor. Most of the rural labor is supplied by the ninth income decile followed by the
second and sixth income deciles. The highest proportions of urban informal and formal labor supplies are
provided by the highest income deciles, but formal labor is more concentrated in the highest income deciles
than informal labor. The tenth urban income decile supplies 59.2% of the total formal labor, while it
provides just 32% of the total informal labor. The lowest deciles provide mainly informal labor. Capital is
also concentrated in the urban areas, with higher provision from the highest income deciles. However, the
highest proportion of capital is supplied by the non-financial institutions which provide 28.8% of the total
capital in the economy.
4.4.2 The benchmark economy
The CGE model is drawn following one of the standard frameworks developed by the IFPRI (Lofgren et al.,
2002) with additional modifications in order to suit the interests of this specific paper. Colombia is treated
as a small-open economy where the international prices are given and are only affected by an exchange rate
that is assumed to be flexible (fixed foreign savings). Producers and consumers maximize their profits and
utility, respectively. Producers use Cobb-Douglas production functions that are estimated endogenously by
the model. Consumption is also calculated endogenously using the shares of the AIDS model.
Constant elasticity of substitution functional forms are used to measure the imperfect substitution be-
tween imports and domestic output sold domestically (Armington function), and between exports and do-
mestic output sold domestically (output transformation function). The elasticity of substitution between
imports and domestic goods, and the elasticity of substitution between exports and domestic sales are set
exogenously.
Capital is fully employed and not mobile, following the assumption that specific capital is needed for each
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of the economic activities. The “illegal factor” is also fully employed and immobile because it cannot be used
for any other economic activity. In both cases, the wage and the factor demand are fixed. Labor supplies in
the rural areas and in the three different urban labor markets are set exogenously and are estimated using
the labor participation model. Feedback loops are used between the labor participation model and the CGE
model in order to achieve a stable equilibrium.3
The households receive money from the factors of production, transfers from the government and transfers
from the rest of the world. The government receives income from taxes, tariffs, capital and transfers from the
rest of the world; and spends it on consumption (of manufacturing, services, security and health), transfers
to households, and savings (or investment depending on the sign of the account). Security is only purchased
by the government because it is considered a public good provided by the state.
The model includes several closures. The investment is defined in terms of savings in order to satisfy the
savings-investment quality, SAV − INV = 0; the capital and the illegal drugs are fully employed and not
mobile, while the labor supplies are fully mobile in order to allow migration between different labor markets.
Finally, the exchange rate is flexible and used to adjust prices and clear the current account, leaving the
foreign savings fixed.
4.4.3 Simulation: Legalization of illegal drugs
The shocks applied to the economy simulate the legalization of drugs worldwide. Because the net effect of
all these changes happening worldwide is uncertain, several scenarios are assumed.4 One of the main shocks
of drugs legalization is the end of the armed conflict, which would affect the economy in two ways. First,
the government would not have to spend the same amount of money on security as before, and the U.S.
would decrease its current military funding for Colombia. Second, it would decrease the importance of the
non-economic factors in the rural-urban migration decision.
Regardless of the scenario considered, the following shocks are always assumed:
1. The production of drugs triples and it remains in the rural areas.
2. The illegal factor is distributed among the rural households under the assumption that the production
of drugs is mainly a rural activity. The distribution of the illegal factor is made in the same proportion
as for the rural labor.
3Convergence in all scenarios is achieved after three iterations.
4A decrease in the price would increase consumption, but effective health campaigns would decrease the consumption. Some
other countries would become potential producers and competition could increase, reducing prices even more. On the other
hand, consumption taxes, or other demand strategies, would decrease consumption. Changes in prices would be also dependent
on how inelastic the international and domestic demands are.
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3. Because the illegal factor is distributed nationwide, the amount of the “income leakage” is reduced to
zero, eliminating the money laundering caused by the drugs prohibition.
4. The illegal sector pays the same rate of taxes as does the agricultural sector, a tax rate of 6.9%.
5. Military aid received from the U.S. to support the drug prohibition is reduced. Then, transfers from
the rest of the world decrease by 30%.
6. In each scenario, changes in labor supply are included following the results estimated by the labor
participation model.
Six scenarios are considered with specific shocks as explained in table 4.1:
Table 4.1: Description of the different scenarios considering different assumptions.
Sc. 1 Sc. 2 Sc. 3 Sc. 4 Sc. 5 Sc. 6
End of armed conflict X X X X
Security expenses: -30%
Armed conflict continues X X
Export price of drugs X X X
is reduced by 20%
Export price of drugs X X X
increases by 20%
No reinvestment of security X X (2) (2)
in other sectors
Reinvestment of security X X (1) (1)
in other sectors(1)
(1)The government doubles its expenditures in health services, and increases
its expenditures in infrastructure and education by 20% each.
(2) The government maintains its expenditures in security and doubles its expenditures
in the health sector.
4.5 Analysis of the results
Tables 4.6 to 4.9 show the macroeconomic impacts of the legalization of drugs leading to the end of the
armed conflict ends. The results suggest that the changes in the economy are strongly dependent on the
reinvestments of the security expenses the government makes once the drugs are legalized. In most cases,
rural households experience an increase in their income due to the higher production of drugs and the
distribution of the “illegal factor” among the household groups. These changes are lower when the export
price of drugs increases, due to the reduction of the exports of drugs. When the government does not reinvest
the security money in other productive sectors, income in the urban areas decreases, with the highest income
deciles being the most affected. Without government reinvestment, urban formal wages are reduced by 9.07%
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when the export price of drugs is reduced, and by 8.86% when the export price of drugs increases. These
reductions in the urban formal wage also decrease urban labor by 2.67% and 3.09%, respectively, causing
the migration of formal workers to the informal market and to the rural areas.
When legalization ends the armed conflict, the best scenarios in terms of income are the scenarios that
simulate a reinvestment of the security expenses in the health, education and transportation sectors, even
if the export price of drugs is reduced (scenario 2). In these cases, most of the rural and urban households
experience an increase in their income, with the higher increases in the highest urban deciles and in the
lowest rural deciles. When the government reinvests the security expenses, urban areas are reactivated with
more jobs and greater wages. Rural-urban migration increases until the point that the expected urban wage
is equal to the rural wage. The highest increases are observed in the formal urban wage: 11.44% with a
reduction of the export price of drugs, and 11.89% with an increase in the export price of drugs. These
increases in the formal urban wage cause a reduction of the formal labor of 3.72% and 4.10% respectively.
The rural wage also increases because of the government reinvestments, and the rural labor supply goes
up as a consequence of the higher rural wage and the higher production of illegal drugs. The rural labor
increases more when the export price of drugs increases (5.54%), than when the price decreases (3.74%).
When the armed conflict does not end with legalization, and the export price of drugs increases, the
benefits in income are even higher for both rural and urban areas as shown in table 4.11 (with exception of the
10th rural decile that has an income reduction). The ongoing armed conflict increases the economic activity
and maintains the country in an “economy of war” situation, where the government military expenditures
are creating jobs in both rural and urban areas. However, if the legalization reduces the export price of
drugs, the highest rural deciles and the lowest urban deciles are affected by receiving a lower income, even if
the government maintains their expenses on security, a situation that is shown in table 4.10. Urban formal
wages increase in these two scenarios by 12.72% when the export price of drugs decreases, and by 14.29%
when the export price of drugs increases. These increases in the formal urban wage cause a reduction in
formal labor of 3.12% and 3.41% respectively, causing migration to the informal and rural markets.
The changes to the supply side of the economy more directly reflect the external shocks assumed in the
different scenarios: the composite price of illegal drugs is reduced when the export price of drugs is reduced,
but in a lower proportion because the exports are substituted by domestic consumption. In a similar way,
when the export price of drugs increases, the composite price increases even more because of an increase
of the product sold domestically. The reinvestment of the government expenditures in health, education
and transportation are reflected in higher production of these sectors in scenarios 2 and 4. The security
supply is reduced in the first four scenarios, as a consequence of the government reduction on military
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expenses. When the armed conflict continues after legalization (scenarios 5 and 6), the only sector that
receives government investments is the health sector, because it is assumed that after legalization, health
campaigns and prevention plans to control addiction would be necessary. The health supply increases by
41.76% and 41.84% in scenarios 5 and 6, respectively, also increasing the price of health services.
The changes in the GDP after legalization under the six different scenarios provide a clearer idea about the
economic costs of the drug prohibition. Contrary to the estimates observed in the literature (see Echeverry,
2004) that estimates the net earnings of the drug business to be 2.3% of the GDP, the results of these
simulations suggest that the costs or the benefits of legalization are always below 2% of the Colombian GDP.
The best scenario, in terms of GDP growth, is the scenario in which the export price of drugs increases and
the government continues its military expenses because of the perpetuation of the war (scenario 6). In this
case, the GDP increases by 1.48%. If the war continues, but the export price of drugs is reduced, the GDP
increases by only 0.40%. When legalization ends the armed conflict, and the government does not reinvest
the military expenses in other productive sectors, the GDP is reduced by 1.04% if the export price of drugs
decreases, and by 1.21% if the export price of drugs increases. With government reinvestment in health,
education and transportation, the GPD increases by 0.35% with a reduction of the export price of drugs,
and by 0.20% with an increase in the export price of drugs.
In terms of household economic welfare, the best scenario is observed when the armed conflict does not
end with the legalization, and the export price of drugs decreases. In this case, both rural and urban areas
receive welfare gains, with greater gains in the lower income deciles. While the highest rural decile received
a median welfare gain of 0.119%, the lowest rural decile receives a gain of 0.166%. Benefits are greater in
the urban areas, but again, the poorest households receive greater gains than the richest households. In
general, most of the scenarios improve the economic welfare of rural and urban households, and in most of the
cases, the distribution of these gains is not monotonic with income, with the poorest households benefitting
more than the richest households. The only two scenarios where welfare losses are observed are when the
armed conflict ends with the legalization and the government does not reinvest the security expenses in
other productive sectors. In these cases, both with an increase or a reduction of the export price of drugs,
the highest rural deciles (deciles 8th, 9th and 10th), and the highest urban deciles (deciles 7th, 8th, 9th and
10th) have a reduction of their economic welfare.
To analyze the total benefits of the legalization of drugs in terms of welfare, the median equivalent and
compensated variation must be multiplied by the number of households in each of the deciles.5 The best
scenario in terms of welfare is scenario 5, which assumes the perpetuation of the armed conflict and the
5Not only by the number of observations that are included in the survey, but also by their expansion factors to have an
accurate representation of the total number of households in the country.
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reduction of the export price of drugs. In this case the economic welfare increases by US$3.142 million
dollars. The second-best scenario in terms of welfare is scenario 2 that assumes the end of the armed conflict
with a reduction of the export price of drugs, and the reinvestment of security expenses in other productive
sectors. The welfare gains in this case are US$3.056 million dollars. When legalization ends the armed
conflict and the government does not reinvest the security expenses, the total welfare losses are US$12,288
dollars when the export price of drugs is reduced, and US$150,121 dollars when the export price of drugs
increases. A summary of the total welfare loses and gains in each of the scenario is described in table 4.14.
4.6 Concluding remarks and further research
In this paper, a CGE model is used to simulate the economic welfare effects of drug legalization on a
producer country using Colombian data for 2006. Six different scenarios with different assumptions about
the consequences of the drug legalization are evaluated. In the specific case of Colombia, where the drug
market is directly related to the perpetuation of the armed conflict and the economic disparities between
rural and urban areas, the end of the conflict is an important assumption in some of the scenarios.
The results suggest that the economic welfare of rural and urban households is slightly improved with
the legalization of drugs, but only when the government reinvests the money not spent in security services
in other productive sectors, such as infrastructure, education and health, or when the legalization does not
end the armed conflict. Both in terms of total amount of welfare gained and redistribution of welfare gains,
the best scenario is when the export price of drugs decreases, and the armed conflict is perpetuated. This
situation is explained because the government is constantly investing in military expenditures, creating new
job opportunities and maintaining the economy in an “economy of war” situation. When legalization ends
the armed conflict and it is not accompanied with government reinvestments in other productive sectors, the
highest urban and rural deciles are worse off in terms of economic welfare, even if the export price of drugs
increases.
The use of microsimulation models to complement the shocks implemented in the CGE model is an
essential part of the analysis. Economic welfare in rural and urban areas is affected by the changes in the
level of prices and wages, and wages are affected by the labor supply in rural, informal and formal markets.
The labor participation model allows for endogenously determining the labor supply in different sectors given
the changes in wages provided by the CGE model. On the other hand, the econometric estimation of an
AIDS model provides two advantages to the simulation of the legalization of drugs. First, the budget shares
for the twenty household groups are estimated econometrically without the assumption of linear Engel curves
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and homogeneous income elasticities for all households. Secondly, the welfare measures are calculated at the
microeconomic level. Once changes in income and prices are estimated in the CGE model, welfare gains or
losses of the legalization of drugs can be analyzed.
Economic welfare in this exercise is measured by changes in prices and income, given by the definitions
of the EV and CV measurements. However the analysis ignores the utility from the provision of more public
goods such as education and health and how the human capital is improved by increasing the consumption
of these services. Similarly, the welfare calculation does not consider the noneconomic effects and the social
costs of war and drug consumption. The civil war in Colombia represents a threat to the population in terms
of fear, kidnappings and deaths among others. On the other hand, an increasing consumption and production
of drugs would increase addiction rates among the population affecting social and family networks, and labor
productivities. If these effects would have taken into consideration when estimating the economic welfare,
continuing with the armed conflict would not have been the best scenario when drugs are legalized.
Further work will analyze the effect of cutting the security expenses and reducing the transfers from
the rest of the world to the government. Although most of the funding from the Plan Colombia was to
finance military expenses, during the last years, the relationship between the Colombian and the American
government has changed, and now the transfers from the U.S. are more directed to finance alternative
development plans to eradicate illegal drugs production such as crops substitution programs and allocation
of land to the direct victims of the conflict. Because the cut of security expenses is such an important
determinant of this paper’s results, new simulations will be calculated by changing the purpose of the
American funding to the Colombian government to estimate new economic welfare effects.
There are many possible ways the research agenda could be extended. For example, the results focusing on
households’ welfare are limited to the economic consequences of the legalization of drugs without considering
the social effects of a rise in drug consumption. Even if the economy is reactivated by a higher production
of drugs and a greater demand of health services or military expenses, the consumption of drugs affects the
social networks in a community and creates productivity problems in the long-run. The results would have
greater policy relevance if the social effects of drugs consumption are included. By simulating a “long-run”
scenario in which the consumption of drugs is spread among the population, changes in productivity can
be estimated to measure the negative social effects of drug consumption in the economy. Other alternatives
to legalization could also be simulated, such as the implementation of social programs and alternative
development crops, programs that are already taking place in Colombia as part of the Plan Colombia. This
economic exercise is useful, not only for the Colombian government when negotiating anti-drug policies with
developed consuming countries, but also for other developing countries that are affected by the illegal drug
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production and trafficking. The model built for Colombia can be replicated in other countries to estimate
the effects of the illegal drug markets in regional economies, and to consider the inter-national impacts of
alternative combinations of assumptions about demand-side management and supply-side options in relation
to drug production.
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Figure 4.1: Model structure: interaction between micro models and CGE model
Table 4.2: Summary of statistics of demographic characteristics of households by labor sector
Labor sectors
Rural Unemployed Informal Formal
Ln wage 14.78 0 14.08 14.95
(1.64) (0) (3.23) (3.12)
Male (% ) 0.71 0.45 0.68 0.75
(0.45) (0.50) (0.47) (0.44)
Age HH head 48.13 57.63 45.73 41.21
(15.70) (17.12) (12.62) (41.21)
Education 2.65 3.25 3.47 4.52
1-6 (low-max) (1.81) (1.82) (1.72) (1.54)
Number of kids 3.76 3.59 3.75 3.47
(¡3 years old) (1.96) (2.04) (1.86) (1.61)
Husband (% ) 0.64 0.43 0.63 0.69
or wife (0.48) (0.49) (0.48) (0.46)
Working persons 1.40 0.91 1.77 1.67
in HH (0.94) (1.04) (0.93) (0.82)
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Figure 4.2: Interaction between the labor participation model and the CGE model: Estimation of wages
and labor supplies
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Table 4.4: Proportion of factors of production used for each economic activity
Rural labor Informal urban Formal urban Capital
illegal 27.2% 0.0% 72.8%
food 15.3% 8.5% 8.0% 68.2%
housing 0.9% 10.6% 8.8% 79.6%
clothing 2.6% 36.4% 9.3% 51.7%
health 3.0% 10.6% 59.1% 27.3%
education 6.4% 22.5% 31.4% 39.7%
culture 2.4% 27.5% 12.2% 57.9%
transp 0.8% 6.4% 7.0% 85.8%
alcohol 1.0% 3.4% 29.0% 66.6%
other 0.0% 5.0% 31.2% 63.8%
security 2.8% 0.4% 74.9% 21.9%
Table 4.5: Proportion of each of the factors of production received by each institution
Rural labor Informal urban Formal urban Capital
non-financ 28.8%
financial 2.1%
rural HH1 7.6% 0.2%
rural HH2 12.5% 0.3%
rural HH3 10.8% 0.7%
rural HH4 9.0% 0.9%
rural HH5 9.1% 0.9%
rural HH6 12.1% 1.0%
rural HH7 10.0% 1.0%
rural HH8 7.3% 1.3%
rural HH9 12.9% 1.2%
rural HH10 8.8% 1.9%
urban HH1 0.9% 0.2% 0.4%
urban HH2 3.5% 0.5% 1.0%
urban HH3 5.1% 0.7% 1.9%
urban HH4 7.1% 1.6% 2.2%
urban HH5 7.5% 2.6% 2.7%
urban HH6 8.0% 3.6% 4.3%
urban HH7 9.1% 6.1% 5.1%
urban HH8 13.6% 10.0% 6.9%
urban HH9 13.2% 15.4% 11.5%
urban HH10 32.0% 59.2% 23.8%
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Table 4.6: Results scenario 1: End of armed conflict, reduction in the export price of drugs and no government
reinvestment (% CHANGES)
Demand side Supply side Macro variables
Income Supply Price
Deciles Rural Urban ILL 66.97 -3.88 GDP -1.04
1st -0.34 0.28 FOOD 0.10 -0.10 Private cons. -1.26
2nd -0.40 0.12 HOUS 3.94 0.57 Public cons. -24.01
3rd 0.05 0.25 CLOTH 0.62 0.70 Investment 8.59
4th 0.21 -0.23 HEALTH 0.18 -2.99
5th 0.20 -1.60 EDU 0.00 -1.37 Labor Market
6th 0.09 -0.60 CULT 0.18 0.39 Wages Labor supply
7th 0.22 -1.10 TRANS 2.87 -0.09 Rural -2.84 3.74
8th 0.36 -1.49 ALCOH 2.08 0.57 Unemployed -7.84
9th 0.09 -1.43 OTR -4.28 -0.93 Informal 4.02 2.99
10th 0.44 -2.87 SECUR -45.51 -4.14 Formal -9.07 -2.67
Table 4.7: Results scenario 2: End of armed conflict, reduction in the export price of drugs and government
reinvestment (% CHANGES)
Demand side Supply side Macro variables
Income Supply Price
Deciles Rural Urban ILL 200.21 -6.81 GDP 0.35
1st 2.23 -0.01 FOOD -0.94 0.10 Private cons. 1.43
2nd 2.35 0.45 HOUS -18.92 -0.77 Public cons. 50.91
3rd 0.83 -0.10 CLOTH -2.41 1.00 Investment -43.26
4th -0.02 0.77 HEALTH 107.91 3.84
5th 0.14 1.00 EDU 25.93 2.79 Labor Market
6th 0.44 0.54 CULT 0.15 0.49 Wages Labor supply
7th 0.06 1.12 TRANS 3.42 -1.21 Rural 4.52 4.77
8th -0.92 1.67 ALCOH 7.00 0.38 Unemployed -10.30
9th 0.09 1.22 OTR -5.05 0.73 Informal 5.88 4.75
10th -1.41 3.02 SECUR -31.29 4.50 Formal 11.44 -3.72
Table 4.8: Results scenario 3: End of armed conflict, increase in the export price of drugs and no government
reinvestment (% CHANGES)
Demand side Supply side Macro variables
Income Supply Price
Deciles Rural Urban ILL 67.15 23.75 GDP -1.21
1st -0.22 0.16 FOOD -0.09 -0.10 Private cons. -1.40
2nd -0.29 -0.02 HOUS 3.64 0.48 Public cons. -23.93
3rd 0.10 0.10 CLOTH 0.25 1.09 Investment 8.27
4th 0.22 -0.40 HEALTH 0.13 -2.88
5th 0.23 -0.76 EDU -0.22 -1.07 Labor Market
6th 0.12 -0.76 CULT -0.10 0.48 Wages Labor supply
7th 0.24 -1.27 TRANS 2.54 -0.19 Rural -3.60 4.51
8th 0.29 -1.66 ALCOH 2.78 0.09 Unemployed -8.85
9th 0.05 -1.61 OTR -4.44 -1.02 Informal 5.59 2.65
10th 0.33 -3.03 SECUR -45.49 -4.03 Formal -8.86 -3.09
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Table 4.9: Results scenario 4: End of armed conflict, increase in the export price of drugs and government
reinvestment (% CHANGES)
Demand side Supply side Macro variables
Income Supply Price
Deciles Rural Urban ILL 66.67 21.02 GDP 0.20
1st 2.30 -0.14 FOOD -1.13 0.10 Private cons. 1.30
2nd 2.41 0.31 HOUS -23.93 -0.77 Public cons. 33.83
3rd 0.88 -0.25 CLOTH 2.86 1.28 Investment -77.91
4th -0.02 0.61 HEALTH 51.89 3.87
5th 0.18 0.85 EDU 20.44 2.89 Labor Market
6th 0.47 0.39 CULT -0.14 0.58 Wages Labor supply
7th 0.09 0.97 TRANS 2.94 -1.32 Rural 3.85 5.54
8th -1.00 1.51 ALCOH 7.06 -0.19 Unemployed -11.31
9th 0.04 1.06 OTR -5.49 0.73 Informal 7.32 4.25
10th -1.55 2.84 SECUR -45.51 4.39 Formal 11.89 -4.10
Table 4.10: Results scenario 5: The armed conflict continues, unchanged security expenses and reduction of
the export price of drugs (% CHANGES)
Demand side Supply side Macro variables
Income Supply Price
Deciles Rural Urban ILL 66.90 -5.71 GDP 0.40
1st 1.22 -0.17 FOOD 0.39 -0.19 Private cons. 1.28
2nd 1.25 -0.21 HOUS -13.92 -0.38 Public cons. 24.63
3rd 0.21 -0.63 CLOTH -1.63 0.50 Investment -40.97
4th -0.47 0.09 HEALTH 41.76 4.15
5th -0.37 0.50 EDU 0.44 2.63 Labor Market
6th -0.15 0.28 CULT -0.25 0.39 Wages Labor supply
7th -0.44 0.97 TRANS -2.63 -1.32 Rural 2.30 4.52
8th -1.12 1.48 ALCOH 4.96 0.85 Unemployed -9.23
9th -0.45 1.36 OTR -0.60 1.18 Informal 3.21 3.13
10th -1.56 3.16 SECUR 0.06 4.92 Formal 12.72 -3.12
Table 4.11: Results scenario 6: The armed conflict continues, unchanged security expenses and increase of
export price of drugs (% CHANGES)
Demand side Supply side Macro variables
Income Supply Price
Deciles Rural Urban ILL 67.08 22.28 GDP 1.48
1st 2.37 0.42 FOOD 1.49 -0.19 Private cons. 2.26
2nd 2.49 0.57 HOUS -12.56 -0.29 Public cons. 24.93
3rd 1.42 0.18 CLOTH 0.28 -0.70 Investment -38.20
4th 0.81 1.03 HEALTH 41.84 4.32
5th 0.99 1.43 EDU 1.35 1.98 Labor Market
6th 1.16 1.20 CULT 1.09 -0.19 Wages Labor supply
7th 0.95 1.93 TRANS -2.19 -0.75 Rural 2.88 5.37
8th 0.04 2.47 ALCOH 6.86 0.28 Unemployed -10.31
9th 0.86 2.34 OTR -0.19 1.71 Informal -3.32 2.47
10th -0.28 4.13 SECUR 0.03 5.76 Formal 14.29 -3.41
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Appendix A
Linkages between CGE, Almost Ideal
Demand System and labor
participation models
A.1 Introduction
Policy makers have increased their interest in the distributional effects of macro policy shocks. Since the
1970s, the World Bank has established the reduction of world poverty as a goal for development, and
several authors have stated the importance of including distributional effects as goals for economic growth
and development (Ravallion, 2001; Barro, 2000). However, when analyzing the effects of macroeconomic
policies on the economy, the aggregate or national accounts ignore the effect that policies may have on
individual household groups. Recently, the literature has been more concerned to find a way to evaluate the
distributional effects of a macroeconomic shock by linking national and aggregate accounts with household
level data.
The uses of general equilibrium frameworks to evaluate the impacts of macro policies have several ex-
planations: the first one is related to the nature of the policy analyzed (Bourguignon et al., 2008). When
the policy has a macroeconomic nature, a general equilibrium is needed, but the effect is different for every
household group. The second one is related to the methodology used to evaluate a policy impact. When
doing ex post impact evaluation analysis, control and treatment groups are defined using different economet-
ric techniques, and the output of the treatment is compared to the output of the control group. However,
if an ex ante analysis is needed for a macro policy, defining control and treatment groups is not an easy
task, because all the households are affected by the policy, and secondly, because none of the households has
received the treatment yet.
In this paper, a methodology to analyze the impacts of an ex ante macroeconomic shock is described by
linking a general equilibrium model with microeconomic models that account for the different responses of
households to the macro shock. Two microeconomic models are used to simulate the households’ behavior:
the first one is a segmented labor participation model using a Heckman two-step methodology (Magnac,
1991); the second one is an Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS), first developed by Deaton and Muellbauer
(1980b). The labor participation model includes behavioral responses in the sense that the household
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responds to second and third-round effects of changes in the macro model. The AIDS uses as an accounting
approach without second-round effects, but it is later used also to calculate welfare measures at the household
level, taking into consideration the changes in income and prices of the CGE model. An application of this
methodology using Colombian data for 2006 shows that the microeconomic labor model and the CGE model
converge after three iterations, and the results can be easily used to calculate economic welfare measures at
the household level.
The paper is divided as follows. The first section below presents a description of the labor participation
model. Then, section A.3 describes the AIDS model used to estimate household demands. Section A.4
describes the social accounting matrix (SAM) and the CGE model used to estimate the macro shocks to
the economy using Colombian data for 2006. The linkages between the two microeconomic models and the
CGE model are described in section A.5. Finally, section A.6 provides some concluding remarks.
A.2 The labor participation model
When analyzing the effects that a macroeconomic shock has on households’ welfare, the labor market is one
of the conduits through the different household types are affected. Households are assumed to be working in
one of the labor markets in the economy, and in some cases, when the wages of these markets are affected,
households decide to migrate to other labor markets because the expected gains there are greater than their
actual earnings. Migration in this case is understood as a movement from one segmented market to another
(formal vs. informal), or from one region to other one (rural vs. urban). Migration between labor markets
is modeled using a labor participation framework following Magnac (1991), Savard (2003) and Cogneau and
Robilliard (2006) on segmented labor markets.
In this specific case, changes in wages are assumed to be exogenous to the labor participation model
because they are estimated in the CGE model. Then, the labor participation model uses these wage changes
to calculate changes in labor supply and migration flows across different labor markets. The urban areas are
disaggregated into three components: unemployed and two labor markets: informal labor and formal labor.
The rural areas only have rural labor, but it is assumed that the rural unemployment rate is 10%.1
The model uses the Integrated Household Survey of Income and Expenses (GEIH) of 2007 for Colombia.
The Survey was conducted in both rural and urban areas collecting information about the demographic,
income, expenses and labor characteristics of 64,119 different households. Most of the information is available
at the household level and disaggregated information is also available for the household head. The labor
participation model uses labor and demographic characteristics of the household heads, assuming that the
1Households consider this unemployment level by calculating their potential rural wage as the 90% of the monetary wages.
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labor choices of other household members are the same.
Table A.1 shows a summary of the statistics of the labor market at the initial equilibrium, with 45.80% of
the total households in the rural sector and 54.19% in the urban sectors. From the urban households, 28.74%
are unemployed, 30.95% belong to the informal sector, and 40.37% to the formal sector. Rural workers have
the lowest level of education, and most of the unemployed are women. Highest wages are earned by the
formal workers followed by the rural workers and the informal workers. Notice that the informal wages are
lower than the rural wages suggesting an incentive to migrate from the urban informal market to the rural
areas.2
In order to determine the direction of the migration flows, the Heckman two-step method with a bivariate
Probit in the first step is used to estimate the probability of a worker being employed in each of the labor
markets. The first Probit estimation determines whether the worker is employed in rural or in urban
areas. The second one, determines in which of the urban labor markets or rural labor market (rural vs.
unemployment), the worker is employed. Because these probabilities are dependent on each other, a bivariate
Probit considers the correlation of the error terms of the two equations. The model can be specified as follows:
Y ∗1i = X1iβ1 + µ1i Y
∗
2i = X2iβ2 + µ2i, (A.1)
where,
µ1i = ηi + 1i µ2i = ηi + 2i, (A.2)
and X1 and X2 are characteristics of the households such as household head gender, age, education, marital
status, other income of the household, number of persons and number of occupied persons.
In the specific case of the urban formal workers, Pr(Y1i = 1) is the probability of being employed in
the urban areas, and Pr(Y2i = 1) is the probability of being employed in the urban formal labor market
rather than in the informal market, or being unemployed. Similar analyses are conducted for the informal
workers, urban unemployed and rural workers. The results of the bivariate Probit models are shown in table
A.2. A higher socioeconomic status, as well as higher level of education, and having other sources of income
different than wages, increases the probability of a worker being employed in urban areas, in any of the
urban labor markets. Larger families are more likely to be found in rural areas, but with greater chances of
being unemployed. When more members of the family are working, the probability of the household being
located in urban areas is greater. Finally, older household heads are less likely to be employed in the rural
areas or in the formal markets, increasing the probability of unemployment and informal employment in the
2This situation could be explained by the noneconomic factors that affect the migration decision of households such as the
existence of an armed conflict in the countryside.
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cities.
Once the bivariate Probits are estimated, Mills ratios for each of the labor markets are calculated as the
ratio between the probability density function and the cumulative density function. The Mills ratios are
then used in the second stage of the Heckman method as independent variables to calculate the potential
wages that each of the workers would earn in each of the markets. Other socioeconomic characteristics of
the households are also included in the regression such as the age of the household head and its square, a
dummy equal to one if the household head is a male, education status and its square, marital status, and
a dummy variable for department.3 The results of the linear regressions for estimating the potential wages
are shown in table A.3.
The potential wages for each of the workers in each of the markets are calculated as the fitted values of
wages in the OLS regressions. Changes in wages are applied to each of these potential wages to determine
whether or not the worker has an incentive to migrate to other labor markets. Following Cogneau and
Robilliard (2006) and Savard (2003), the location of each of the labor markets for worker i is given by the
following scheme:
1. The worker i chooses the rural sector if wRi > w
E
i .
2. The worker i chooses being unemployed if w0i > w
R
i , w
0
i > w
I
i , and w
0
i > w
F
i − costf .
3. The worker i chooses the informal sector if w Ii > w
R
i , w
I
i > w
0
i , and w
I
i > w
F
i − costf .
4. The worker i chooses the formal sector if wFi − costf > wRi , wFi − costf > w0i , and wFi − costf > w Ii ,
where wRi is the rural potential wage of worker i ; w
0
i is the urban reservation wage of worker i ; w
I
i is the
informal potential wage of worker i ; and wFi − costf is the formal potential wage of worker i minus a cost
of entry to the formal market, which is also estimated econometrically. The definition of the expected wage
(wEi ) which enters into the migration decision of rural workers, follows Harris and Todaro (1970): it is equal
to the product between urban wages (both informal and formal wages) and the probability of getting a job
in the urban sector (in the informal and formal markets). Unemployment in both urban and rural areas is
considered in the migration decision.4
Once each of the workers has chosen in which labor market to work, the labor supply is calculated as
the sum of the workers in each market, taking into consideration the expansion factors of the survey. The
labor supply is then used as an input in the CGE model to calculate a second round of macro changes. The
mechanism by which the two models are interconnected is described in section A.5.
3Colombia is divided in 32 departments. The capital city, Bogota, has its own geographical division named district capital.
4Following official statistics and estimates done by the author, an unemployment rate of 10% is considered in both areas.
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A.3 The Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS)
The second microeconomic model used to feed the CGE model is the AIDS. The AIDS allows to model
households behavior of the CGE model taking into consideration the microeconomic theory. The AIDS was
developed by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980b) as an alternative approach to the linear and the translog models
in the literature. The main difference with the linear models is that the AIDS does not assume straight
Engel curves for different households considering the different income levels between groups. Additionally,
it is more flexible than the other models, allowing for the estimation of many free parameters as there are
independent economic parameters such as the cross-price and income elasticities of demand.
Additionally, two modifications are considered when estimating the AIDS. The first one is the inclusion
of an equivalence scale of sociodemographic characteristics that affect the estimation of the expenditure
function following the methodology proposed by Ray (1983). The second one is the estimation of the shares
using censored data following the two-stage estimation proposed by Shonkwiler and Yen (1999). A similar
approach, used by Atuesta and Paredes (2011), calculates the AIDS model for Colombia with censored data
to estimate a spatial cost of living index for the country.5
According to the AIDS, the preferences of a rational consumer are represented by the following expendi-
ture function:
c(p, u) = (1− u) log(a(p)) + u log(b(p)), (A.3)
where
log(a(p)) = α0 +
m∑
i=m
αi log pi +
1
2
m∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
γij log pi log pj , (A.4)
and
log(b(p)) = log(a(p)) + β0
∏
i
pβii . (A.5)
Both, namely log(b(a)) and log(b(p)), are homogeneous of degree one in prices satisfying the theoret-
ical restrictions of the expenditure function. Because the consumption shares are the derivatives of the
expenditure function with respect to prices (Shepard’s lemma), the estimable shares are defined as:
si = αi +
m∑
j=1
γij log pj + βi(logw − (α0 + log a)), (A.6)
where α, β and γ are parameters of the model; si is the budget share of good i ; pi is the price of good i ;
and w is total expenditure.
5In that paper, only the food consumption is considered, and the estimation is done only for urban areas.
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The first modification of this estimable share is proposed by Ray (1983) who included a general equiva-
lence scale to control for demographic characteristics of each of the households. This equivalence scale enters
into the equation twice: the first way is through a basic element which is constant across price distributions
and utility m0, while the second one is through an element that varies across utility ϕ. the function ϕ is
defined such that the theoretical restrictions of the expenditure function remain unaffected. For the AIDS,
the best way of defining ϕ is the following:
ϕ(z, p, u) = exp
u∏
j
p
βj
j
∏
j
p
θ1jz1+θ2jz2
j − 1

 . (A.7)
The second modification uses censored data in the estimation of the shares, needed to correct for the
bias generated by the households that reported zero consumption. Perales and Chavas (2000) analyzes the
causes of zero consumption in the case of Colombian households. After studying the distribution of the
zero expenditures by income class and within income groups, the authors conclude that the zero shares are
explained because some goods are too expensive for some of the households to consume. The bias produced
by these corner solutions is reduced by including censored data in the estimation following the methodologies
of Heien and Wessels (1990) (H-W hereafter) or Shonkwiler and Yen (1999) (S-Y hereafter).
In this paper the two-stage method proposed by S-Y is used.6 The first step uses a binary variable equal
to one if the household consumed the good and zero otherwise, and regresses it as a function of demographic
and socioeconomic characteristics. Probit models are estimated for each of the consumption goods and the
cumulative (Φ) and the density (φ) probability functions are estimated. In the second step, the estimation
of the shares includes the cumulative probability function as a scalar multiplying the non-linear part of the
equation, while the density function enters as an extra linear variable in the estimation.
The modified estimable shares, for the nine different consumption categories, with the demographic
equivalent scale and censored data has the following functional form:
si = Φ[αi +
∑m
j=1 γij log pj + (βi + θi1z1 + θi2z2 + θi3z3)(logw
−(9 + log(1 + ρ1z1 + ρ2z2 + ρ3z3) + log a))] + δφ,
(A.8)
where log a = α0 +
∑m
i=m αi log pi +
1
2
∑m
i=1
∑m
j=1 γij log pi log pj .
α, β, γ, θ and ρ are parameters of the model; si is the budget share of good i ; pi is the price of good i ;
and w is total expenditure. z1 , z2 and z3 are number of persons in the household, education of the household
head, and location (rural or urban) of the household respectively; and δ is an extra parameter of the model
6S-Y use Monte Carlo simulations to compare the bias reduction of their method with the bias reduction using the method-
ology proposed by H-W. The results suggest that H-W estimator is inconsistent and performs poorly.
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with no restrictions. In order to maintain the additivity restriction of the shares, the system estimates n− 1
equations, where n is the number of shares, and the last share is recovered as a residual of the n− 1 shares.
The β parameters provide information about the characteristics of the goods with respect to income
level. If βi > 0 , an increase in the expenditure would increase the budget share of i, then, the good i is a
luxury. On the contrary, if βi < 0 , the good i is a necessity. The parameters γ measure the changes in the
budget shares following a change in the relative prices.
The AIDS model satisfies restrictions of adding-up, homogeneity and symmetry: it adds up to total
expenditure (the sum of the budget shares is equal to the total expenditure), it is homogeneous of degree
zero in prices and total expenditure, and the total expenditure satisfies the Slutsky symmetry.7 These
theoretical restrictions above are imposed through the linearity of the parameters in the following way:
n∑
i=1
αi = 1,
n∑
i=1
γij = 0,
n∑
i=1
βi = 0,
3∑
j=1
θij = 0, (A.9)
∑
j
γij = 0, (A.10)
γij = γji. (A.11)
As in the labor participation model, the GEIH of 2007 for Colombia is used. Unitary prices are only
reported for the “food” category. However, the DANE provides price indexes for 79 goods and services for
low-, middle- and high-income households. Once the goods and services of the Survey are aggregated into
these 79 categories, prices are assigned according to the level of income of the households (low, middle and
high). In order to have an AIDS model compatible with the CGE model, the nine categories included in
the SAM should be the same as the ones used for the estimation of the AIDS. Following Urzua (2010), the
weighting factors for each of the nine goods are calculated for each household:
ajh =
wjh
Wih
, (A.12)
where wjh is the expenditure of household h in the individual good j that belongs to group i (where j =
1...1,055,945), and Wih is the total expenditure of household h in group i (where j = 1...9). Using these
weights and the unit prices assigned for each of the individual goods, the composite price of group i is
calculated as:
Pi = p
a1
1 p
a2
2 . . . p
an
n . (A.13)
7The Slutsky symmetry means that
∂hi(p,u)
∂pj
=
∂2e(p,u)
∂pj∂pi
=
∂hj(p,u)
∂pi
; where hi(.) and hj(.) are the Hicksian demands of
goods i and j respectively; p are prices and u is the level of utility.
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This is the price of group i used in the estimation of the AIDS. The composite expenditure of group i
is the sum of the expenditures of each of the goods j which belong to group i. The budget shares are easily
estimated by dividing the expenditure of each of the groups over the total expenditure of the household.
The AIDS is estimated using a non-linear seemingly unrelated regression (nlsur) where the shares are the
dependent variables, and the prices, total expenditures, socio-demographic characteristics and the density
functions (φ) are the independent variables.
The results of the Probit models estimated in the first stage are shown in table A.4. Households with lower
socioeconomic status and a greater number of household members have greater probability of consuming
food, clothing, housing, health, tobacco and alcohol and other services; while households with a greater
socioeconomic status and lower number of household members have a greater probability of consuming
education, transportation and cultural services. The consumption share of food increases when the household
head is a female, while the consumption share of the other eight groups increase when the household head
is a male. Older household heads have a lower probability of consuming clothing, tobacco and alcohol, and
transportation services. The level of education increases the consumption shares of all the consumption
groups, and urban households are more likely to have greater consumption shares of housing, education and
transportation than rural households.
The coefficients of the estimable shares are shown in table A.5. Most of the coefficients are significant
at the 95% level, excepting some of the θ parameters of the equivalent component for demographics. The
parameters of the AIDS are used to estimate budget shares for all households, and the median share of each
income group are then used as parameters for the CGE model. The AIDS model is also used for estimating
the welfare measures of each income group, once the changes in income and prices have been calculated in
the CGE model.
Two measures of welfare are used in the analysis. The first one is the compensated variation (CV) that
measures how much money the consumer has to receive in order to offset the losses of the price increase.
The second one is the equivalent variation (EV) that measures how much money the consumer has to give
away in order to have a loss equal to the price increase. Both measures answer the same problem: how
much extra income is needed in order to offset the price changes. Then, negative EV and CV mean that the
consumer receives a gain in economic welfare, and positive measures mean a loss in economic welfare. The
CV and EV are defined as:
CV (p0, p1, w) = e(p0, u0)− e(p1, u0) = w − e(p1, u0), (A.14)
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EV (p0, p1, w) = e(p0, u1)− e(p1, u1) = e(p0, u1)− w, (A.15)
where e(pi , uj ) is the expenditure function estimated with prices i and utility j. The expenditure function is
calculated using two different price indexes: log(a) which is defined before in equation A.8, and b(p) which
is defined as:
b(p) =
n∏
i=1
piβi . (A.16)
A.4 The CGE model
A.4.1 Construction of the Social Accounting Matrix (SAM)
The main source of data for the CGE model comes from the SAM. The SAM is built following Corredor and
Pardo (2008) using Colombian data from 2006. The National Department of Statistics, DANE, provides the
tables required for the construction of an aggregated SAM: the utilization matrix (UM), the supply matrix
(SM) and the general economic equilibrium matrix (GEE). The UM shows the final and intermediate demand
for each of the products in the economy. The final demand is disaggregated into domestic consumption and
exports. The SM shows the components of the total supply for each product at producers’ prices. The final
supply consists of imports, domestic production, taxes, import taxes, and commercial and transportation
margins. Finally, the GEE shows the economic activities of the institutions. The DANE disaggregates the
demand into five institutions: households, financial firms, non-financial firms, government and non-profit
organizations.
The production side is disaggregated into ten legal sectors and one illegal sector: illegal drugs, food, hous-
ing, clothing, health, education, culture, transportation (infrastructure), addictions (alcohol and tobacco),
other services and security. All products, excepting the security and health services, are both imported and
exported. The main exports come from the transportation and the food sectors (46% and 16% respectively).
The exports of illegal drugs represent only the 3.37% of the total exports. The highest level of imports is
observed in the housing sector followed by the transportation sector (44.35% and 17.93% of the total imports
respectively).
Additionally, the DANE provides a “satellite” account for the illegal drug activities which is used to
model the illegal drug market. According to the definition provided by the System of National Accounts of
1993 (SNA93), “satellite accounts are linked with the central framework of national accounts and through
them to the main body of the integrated economic statistics. (...) Because they preserve close connections
with the central accounts, they facilitate analyses of specific fields in the context of macroeconomic accounts
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and analyses” (SNA, 1993).
The Quality of Life Survey for 2003 and the GEIH of 2007, both conducted by the DANE, are used
to disaggregate the factors of production and the demand side of the SAM. Corredor and Pardo (2008)
also provide tables explaining how this disaggregation is accomplished. Households are divided into income
deciles and labor is disaggregated into three different labor forces, rural labor, urban informal labor, and
urban formal labor, and unemployment. However, an additional household disaggregation by location is
needed in order to analyze the effects of legalization in rural and urban areas. To accomplish this task, the
2005 Census, also conducted by the DANE, is used to divide households into rural and urban areas. Finally,
a disaggregation of households by location and by deciles is obtained yielding in total 20 representative
households (ten rural and ten urban).
After the disaggregation, the original SAM is rebalanced using the RAS method first developed by Stone
and Brown (1962). Households are the owners of the factors of production and receive money from them.
However, the illegal activity only uses a factor of production called the illegal factor which is not paid to
the households but to the rest of the world. This account is called income leakage and basically represents
the opportunity cost of the prohibition (money the households are not receiving because of the illegality of
the drugs). The SAM is built in a way that the urban households only provide urban labor and the rural
households only provide rural labor.
A.4.2 The benchmark economy
The CGE model is drawn following one of the standard frameworks developed by the IFPRI (Lofgren et al.,
2002) with additional modifications in order to suit the Colombian economic situation. Colombia is treated
as a small-open economy where the international prices are given and are only affected by an exchange rate
that is assumed to be flexible (fixed foreign savings). Producers and consumers maximize their profits and
utility respectively. Producers use Cobb-Douglas production functions that are estimated endogenously by
the model. Consumption is estimated endogenously but using the budget shares previously estimated in the
AIDS as exogenous parameters.
Constant elasticity of substitution functional forms are used to measure the imperfect substitution be-
tween imports and domestic output sold domestically (the Armington function), and between exports and
domestic output sold domestically (also known as the output transformation function). The elasticity of
substitution between imports and domestic goods, and the elasticity of substitution between exports and
domestic sales are set exogenously.
Capital is fully employed and not mobile, following the assumption that specific capital is needed for
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each of the economic activities. The “illegal factor” is also fully employed and immobile because it cannot
be used for any other economic activity. In both cases, the wages and the factor demands are fixed. Labor
supplies in rural areas and in the three different urban labor markets are set exogenously and are estimated
using the labor participation model. The households receive money from the factors of production, transfers
from the government and transfers from the rest of the world. The government receives income from taxes,
tariffs, capital and transfers from the rest of the world; and spends it on consumption (of manufacturing,
services, security and health), transfers to households, and savings (or investment depending on the sign
of the account). The government is the only institution that spends money on security because security is
considered a public good provided by the state.
The model includes three closures. The first one is that investment is saving-driven, meaning that
investment is defined in terms of savings in order to satisfy the savings-investment quality, SAV −INV = 0.
The second one is the closure of the factors of production: capital and illegal drugs are fully employed
and not mobile, and the labor supplies are fully mobile in order to allow migration between different labor
markets. Finally, the foreign savings are fixed and the model uses a flexible exchange rate to adjust prices
and clear the current account.
A.5 Linkages between the microeconomic models and the CGE
When analyzing the impact of macroeconomic shocks, macroeconomic models should be combined with
micro models in order to simulate the effect of the shock in many different dimensions, and consequently,
to the specific individual households. This section explains the interaction between the two microeconomic
models described above and the CGE model. The shock is imposed to the CGE model affecting all the
agents in the economy. Then, changes predicted by the CGE model are then applied to the microeconomic
models to simulate the microeconomic behavior of each of the household groups.
When all households are affected by the same policy, it is necessary to analyze not only the micro coun-
terfactual (impacts within the same group), but also the macro counterfactuals (impacts between different
groups) (Bourguignon et al., 2008). The literature describes several methods to introduce micro analysis
in macroeconomic models. The simplest one is to introduce heterogeneous representative households in the
CGE models. Instead of assuming that all households behave in the same way (one representative household
at the national level), the assumption here is that all households within a specific group behave in the same
way. This approach is useful when the policy implemented does not affect the intra-distribution of income
within each of the household groups. Extensions of this approach have tried to increase the level of house-
82
hold’s behavior heterogeneity by including as many representative households in the CGE as the number of
households in the economy (see Lofgren et al., 2003; and Dervis et al., 1982).
The macro models with representative households have been criticized because it is not possible to model
microeconomic behavior within groups with just one observation (one representative household per group).
Then, all households must have the same budget shares because the demand is not estimated econometrically
(Bourguignon et al., 2008). To introduce household level data in macro models, three approaches have been
suggested by the literature: the top-down accounting modeling, the top-down simulation modeling, and the
feedback loops from top to bottom. The top-down accounting modeling uses results from the CGE model
as a shock to the household level micro model to estimate policy implications at the microeconomic level.
The households in this case do not change the behavior of consumption or labor participation with the
new information. The changes from the CGE model only affect the outcome of the micro model without
considering behavioral effects. The criticism of this approach is that it is only consistent when the markets
are competitive or when the changes at the macro level only affect in a marginal way the budget of individuals
(Bourguignon et al., 2008).
The top-down simulation modeling considers the behavioral responses of individual from a macro shock.
When changes in prices, income and wages are calculated at the macro level, these changes enter into the
decision-making of the households changing their consumption and labor participation patterns. With non-
competitive markets or rationed markets, considering these second-round effects is needed in order to have
a simulation consistent to household economic behavior.
Finally, Savard (2003) suggests a third method that includes feedback loops from top to bottom until
convergence is achieved. He explains that, in order to have coherence between the CGE model and the
household models, it is necessary to obtain a converging solution between the two models. When these
results are compared with those that use only a top-down approach, Bourguignon and Savard (2008) show
that a bias is generated by ignoring the feedback effects from the micro to the macro models, particularly
when analyzing labor markets.
In this specific case, feedback loops from top to bottom are considered between the CGE and the labor
participation models using behavioral responses at the micro level. When the shock is implemented in the
CGE model, changes in prices, wages and household income are calculated. Workers receive information
about the new wages and migrate according to their individual preferences, following the labor participation
scheme proposed in section A.2. Once workers move from one labor market to the other, the total number of
workers in each labor market is re-estimated in order to calculate the new labor supplies. These new labor
supplies are then compared to the initial supply levels and the percentage changes are used to “feed” the
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CGE model.
The CGE model receives this new information about the labor supplies as a shock to change again prices,
income and wages. A new level of wages is calculated and used again in the labor participation model to
calculate changes in labor supplies. These iterations between the CGE model and the labor participation
model continue until the models achieve convergence. According to Savard (2003), by including these
iterations between the micro and the macro model, the bias of using different data sources in each of the
model is minimized and the simulations produce more accurate results.
The iteration between the CGE model and the AIDS is simpler. The AIDS is used to estimate the
consumption shares of each of the household groups, and these shares are included as parameters in the
CGE model. The shock is imposed in the CGE model and the iteration between the CGE model and the
labor participation model begins. Once these two models find convergence, the changes in prices and income
of the CGE model are used in the AIDS to calculate the welfare measures for each of the household groups.
These measures are calculated based on a median representative household, but they can also be calculated
for different percentiles of the intra-group income distribution.
Both, the labor participation model and the AIDS use the feedback loops with the CGE model. However,
only the labor participation model assumes microsimulations in which the individual behavior is fed from
the macro shock, and at the same time, it estimates the changes in labor supply that are going to be used for
the reestimation of the macro shock itself. The relationship between the AIDS model and the CGE model
is straightforward: the shares are used ex ante to the macro shock, and the AIDS parameters are used ex
post for the estimation of welfare measures once the utility and the expenditure functions, evaluated at the
new prices and income, have been recovered.
A.6 Conclusions
In this paper, a methodology that links macro models to microeconomic models is explained. This method-
ology is useful for simulating the effects at the household level of imposing a macroeconomic shock to the
economy. Because the shock would affect all the agents of the economy, a general equilibrium framework
is needed. Once the changes at the macro level have been calculated, the microeconomic models are used
to estimate the impact of the shock at the household level. In this specific example, two microeconomic
models are used in order to understand migration decisions following labor participation of individuals, and
consumption patterns.
Assuming imperfect labor markets with unemployment, using only top-down accounting models does not
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provide a result consistent with microeconomic behavior. For this reason, it is necessary to link the labor
participation model and the CGE model using simulation techniques and feedback loops from top to bottom.
The simulation techniques take into consideration the behavioral responses of households to the shock. In
other words, the shock would change not only the outcome of the household decision, but the household
taking-decision process itself. In the case of the AIDS model, this simulation is not needed because the
changes only affect marginally the household budgets. Then, once the budget shares are estimated in a first
round and included in the CGE model, the macro shocks are calculated and the results are used for the
calculation of welfare measures.
By using data for Colombia, and an application that simulates the effect of legalization of drugs in the
Colombian economy, this methodology is used in Chapter 4 to calculate the changes in economic welfare of
households. The CGE and the labor participation models converge after three iterations, and the AIDS is
then used for calculating welfare measures. After estimating six scenarios with different assumptions about
the prices, future of the armed conflict predictions, and government reinvestment, the author concludes that
the economic welfare gains of legalizing drugs are too small if the social cost of war and drug addiction is
not considered.
85
Table A.1: Summary of statistics of demographic characteristics of households by labor sector. Standard
deviations in parentheses.
Labor sectors
Rural Unemployed Informal Formal
Ln wage 14.78 0 14.08 14.95
(1.64) (0) (3.23) (3.12)
Male (% ) 0.71 0.45 0.68 0.75
(0.45) (0.50) (0.47) (0.44)
Age HH head 48.13 57.63 45.73 41.21
(15.70) (17.12) (12.62) (41.21)
Education 2.65 3.25 3.47 4.52
1-6 (low-max) (1.81) (1.82) (1.72) (1.54)
Number of kids 3.76 3.59 3.75 3.47
(¡3 years old) (1.96) (2.04) (1.86) (1.61)
Husband (% ) 0.64 0.43 0.63 0.69
or wife (0.48) (0.49) (0.48) (0.46)
Working persons 1.40 0.91 1.77 1.67
in HH (0.94) (1.04) (0.93) (0.82)
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Table A.5: Coefficients of the AIDS model with censored data and equivalent component.
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
α1 0.287*** γ11 -0.233*** θ11 0.014*** δ1 -0.217*** ρ1 -0.841***
α2 0.137*** γ12 0.053*** θ21 0.013*** δ2 0.497*** ρ2 0.896***
α3 -0.063*** γ13 0.134*** θ31 -0.009*** δ3 0.142*** ρ3 -0.071***
α4 0.018*** γ14 0.026*** θ41 -0.000 δ4 0.052***
α5 0.097*** γ15 0.085*** θ51 0.006*** δ5 0.048***
α6 0.058*** γ16 0.035*** θ61 -0.001*** δ6 0.059***
α7 0.285*** γ17 0.067*** θ71 -0.036*** δ7 0.184***
α8 -0.085*** γ18 0.072*** θ81 0.018*** δ8 0.183***
β1 -0.080*** γ22 -0.162*** θ12 -0.002***
β2 0.026*** γ23 0.048*** θ22 0.000***
β3 0.023*** γ24 0.002*** θ32 0.000**
β4 0.001*** γ25 0.017*** θ42 0.000
β5 0.026*** γ26 -0.026*** θ52 0.000***
β6 -0.003*** γ27 0.098*** θ62 0.001***
β7 0.058*** γ28 -0.005*** θ72 -0.001***
β8 -0.072*** γ33 -0.227*** θ82 0.005***
γ34 -0.007*** θ13 0.005***
γ35 0.027*** θ23 -0.001***
γ36 -0.024*** θ33 -0.006***
γ37 0.079*** θ43 -0.001***
γ38 0.074*** θ53 -0.002***
γ44 -0.061*** θ63 0.003***
γ45 0.022*** θ73 -0.001***
γ46 -0.005*** θ83 0.003***
γ47 0.010***
γ48 0.004***
γ55 -0.030***
γ56 -0.075***
γ57 0.033***
γ58 0.015***
γ66 0.096***
γ67 0.053***
γ68 -0.027***
γ77 -0.358***
γ78 0.163***
γ88 -0.235***
*, ** and *** represent the level of significance to 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
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